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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Cattle prices have been trending downward since the sharp price 
break beginning in late 1973. During this time, cattle producers have 
experienced great uncertainty and financial risk. Large price fluctua-
tions coupled with narrow profit margins have emphasized the importance 
and necessity of risk management if a cattle producer is to maintain 
a financially sound and profitable operation. 
Faced with substantial risk, many decision makers began searching 
for methods to reduce the inherent price risk involved in producing 
cattle. As a result, there has been increased interest in the futures 
markets. Many cattle producers are becoming aware of the risk reducing 
potential of hedging and also are beginning to realize the advantages 
of hedging strategies that help determine whether and when to hedge. 
The feeder cattle futures market can serve the risk management 
needs of both the feeder cattle producer and the cattle feeder. The 
feeder cattle producer can use this futures market for short hedging1 
his anticipated production of feeder cattle while the cattle feeder can 
1 A short feeder cattle hedge involves selling an amount of feeder 
cattle futures contracts equal to the anticipated production of feeder 
cattle. 
1 
2 
2 
use it to long hedge his anticipated needs for feeder cattle. The 
feeder cattle futures market has been characterized by low trading 
volume, but the volume has significantly increased during the.past two 
years (Table I). Use of this futures market for hedging is now 
feasible. 
It is becoming more evident by early 1978 that the cattle price 
cycle has bottomed and several years of upward trending prices lie 
ahead. The January 1, 1978, U. S. cattle inventory figures show the 
total cattle inventory down 5 percent from 1977 and 9 percent from 
1976. Beef cow numbers have declined even more, decreasing 6 percent 
from 1977 and 12 percent from 1976. Heifers for beef cow replacement 
are down 11 percent and 19 percent, respectively, compared with 1977 
and 1976. 
Even though it is apparent cattle prices will be climbing higher 
in the future, price risk will not be eliminated. In some respects, 
the risk will be even greater since the feeder cattle producer and the 
cattle feeder can expect to incur higher operating costs in the form 
of higher prices for stocker calves and_feeder cattle, respectively. 
In addition, cattle prices will continue to be volatile. Just as 
periods of rising cattle prices have occurred since the sharp price 
decline in late 1973 (Figure 1), there will also be periods of falling 
prices during the upward phase of the cattle price cycle. The short 
hedge will still be used, but more expertise will be required to obtain 
2A long feeder cattle hedge involves buying an amount of feeder 
cattle futures contracts equal to the anticipated needs for feeder 
cattle. 
3 
TABLE I 
MONTHLY FEEDER CATTLE FUTURES VOlUME, 1971-1977 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Jan. 873 1,899 1,279 1,680 2,300 7,584 
Feb. 318 1,242 1,682 1,548 2,801 8,301 
Mar. 352 2,936 1,433 2,212 3,421 10 '972 
Apr. 265 1,930 2,014 2,164 4,814 15,453 
May 476 1,581 . 2,298 2,336 4,000 11,241 
June 460 1,239 4,179 3,890 3,504 11,660 
July 477 3,274 4, 715 3,813 6,735 11,104 
Aug. 387 3,367 4,662 2,590 4,784 12,603 
Sept. 789 2,091 3,237 2,746 11,158 11,097 
Oct. 726 1,874 2, 720 2,184 9,901 11,295 
Nov. 106 936 793 1,605 2,069 6,113 11,029 
Dec. 414 1,398 620 1,175 2,355 3,264 10,935 
Total 520 7,457 22,846 30,999 29,587 62,795 133,274 
Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange (1977). 
67 68 
Figure 1. 
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the desired results from its use. Selective short hedging strategies 
will be needed to protect against the short run price declines. 
5 
Upward trending prices present new opportunities for the long 
hedge by cattle feeders. Several factors contribute to its potential 
use. The completion of the liquidation phase of the cow herd will 
result in ~~duced supplies of fed cattle .. Decreased supplies of beef 
will result in higher fed cattle prices. Cattle feeders will have the 
incentive to bid up the price on the limited supplies of feeder cattle. 
The feed grain situation is another contributing factor. Large 
inventories of feed grains have caused grain prices to fall, reducing 
the cost qf gain -for cattle feeders. This gives added incentive to 
bid up the price of feeder cattle. 
Summing up, these fundamentals point to increased demand and 
higher prices for feeder cattle. In the next few years, a .long feeder 
cattle hedge may be more effective in reducing risk and uncertainty 
than a short live cattle hedge for the cattle feeder. 
However, simply knowing the fundamentals and the long run outlook 
for price trends does not guarantee effective hedging programs. At 
times, prices seem to move in a direction opposite to the supply and 
demand fundamentals. Therefore, considerable merit exists in develop--
ing hedging strategies that will aid cattle producers in effectively 
managing. risk. Since cattle producers as a group represent varying 
levels of understanding and ability concerning futures markets, an 
objective hedging tool is desirable. 
The Problem 
Feeder cattle prices have exhibi~ed erratic behavior in recent 
years. This price'volatility has increased the already substantial 
degree of risk faced by the U. S. feeder cattle producer and cattle 
feeder. It is possible to reduce this price risk by hedging on the 
feeder cattle futures market. For a feeder cattle producer or cattle 
feeder who ranks profit maximization high among his set of goals, the 
classical hedge, taking opposite but equal positions in the cash and 
feeder cattle futures market, may not give the desired results. A 
hedging strategy to reduce price risk and maximize profits requires 
optimal timing of the placement and lifting of a hedge. Determining 
the proper time to hedge is further complicated because the anticipa-
tion of reports, daily weather changes, or bunchy market receipts may 
cause the feeder cattle cash and futures markets to behave differently 
from each other at a given point in time. Improved analysis and hedg-
ing strategies are needed to help feeder cattle producers and cattle 
feeders determine the proper time to place and lift the hedge. 
Hypotheses 
6 
1. Price analysis of the feeder cattle futures contracts, commonly 
called technical analysis, will assist the hedger in determining the 
optimum time to place and lift a hedge for feeder cattle. 
2. Determination of the optimum time to place and lift a hedge 
will increase the hedger's profits and reduce his price risk. 
Procedure 
The general procedure is to technically analyze price movement 
in the feeder cattle futures market and develop tools which wi+l aid the 
hedger in placing and lifting the hedge. This general objective can be 
divided into the followtng specific procedures: 
7 
1. To optimize point and ~igure charts for the feeder cattle 
futures market. 
2. To optimize moving averages for the feeder cattle futures 
market. 
3. To compare profitability and reduction in price risk against 
the unhedged strategy for the classical hedging strategy and hedging 
strategies based on point and figure charts and moving averages. 
Literature Review 
The feeder cattle futures market is little more than six,years 
old, and formal research on this market and marketing strategies is very 
sparse. There have been a few studies dealing with hedging strategies 
for fed cattle. Other studies concerning futures markets have been 
more general and descriptive in nature. The more recent and relevant 
· results will be discussed. 
Futrell (1970) states that agricultural producers, in general, 
have relatively little background and knowledge about futures markets. 
Many have had very negative attitudes toward these markets, 
considering them something akin to gambling. Developing 
hedging interests from this group has required, and con-
tinues to require, substantial educational effort to increase 
understanding of futures markets and their particular appli-
cation to the farm business (p. 843). 
Peck (1975) analyzed the performance of the futures market in 
increasing returns to the egg producer. A portfolio approach was used 
which analyzed net returns to producers in conjunction with the amount 
of risk associated with each specific net return. Peck demonstrated 
that optimal hedging strategies reduced markedly the producer's exposure 
8 
to unpredictable price variation. The use of futures markets stabilized 
producer returns and, when used in conjunction with cash price fore-
casts, increased producer's income and reduced the risk associated with 
the expected increased income. Peck suggested that additional work 
needs to be done with other commodities using this and other approaches. 
Davis (1973) demonstrated that price forecasting techniques and 
measures of a stocker operator's risk profile can be effectively com-
bined in a marketing decision model to reduce the risk associated 
with unfavorable price changes. Davis considered both buying and sell-
ing decision strategies. Within each of these two broad categories, 
three alternatives were evaluated involving the cash market, forward 
contracting, and the futures market. Davis felt that promising results 
could be obtained from additional research incorporating selective 
hedging strategies. 
Holland, Purcell, and Hague (1972) concluded that marketing strate-
gies involving hedging can be used successfully by the manager of cattle 
feeding operations. It was also pointed out that short hedging can be 
an efficient management tool even during periods of upward trending 
cattle prices. Results of this study suggested that hedging strategies 
are available which not only decrease the variability of net returns but 
also increase the mean net returns, something that is not usually 
expected. They added that further work, especially involving incorpor-
ation of more refined short run price projection techniques, would 
appear to be very promising. 
McCoy and Price (1975) found that hedging strategies can be 
advantageously used by the feedlot operator. Several of the strategies 
tested resulted in greater average profits and less variance than the 
9 
completely unhedged alternative. The effect on profits of not feeding 
cattle when hedging criteria so indicated were also analyzed. In no 
instances were profits greater for partial capacity versus full 
capacity. 
Franzmann (1975) expressed the need for techniques that would help 
cattlemen determine the appropriate times to hedge cattle. He indi-
cated that pertinent supply and demand fundamentals are necessary 
but not sufficient to obtain the best timing in the placement and 
lifting of hedges. It was suggested that producers utilize technical 
strategies in order to do a better job of selective hedging. Franzmann 
concluded, "Proper use of technical tools assures that the hedge is em-
' 
played only when needed thereby adding to feedlot profits and reducing 
the threat of bankruptcy." 
Williams (1973) states that technical tools such as charts are 
essential for successfully hedging feeder cattle. Williams indicated 
that charts are especially helpful in timing the hedge and placing the 
stops since they put price changes into perspective. 
Working in the area of technical price analysis, Zieg and Kaufman 
(1974) determined the optimized parameters for point and figure chart-
ing for several commodities. They defined optimal as that combination 
of variables yielding the highest profit and reliability, with a 
weighting bias toward reliability. In most ca~es, the optimized para-
meters increased both cumulative net profits and the percent reliabil-
ity. They felt that optimal values should be selected for each delivery 
month for each commodity, and that these values must be periodically 
re-evaluated. The optimized parameters for live cattle were reported 
as a 30 point box size with a three box reversal. 
10 
Reinfeld (1977) also conducted research involving optimization of 
point and figure charts. The September, 1974, copper contract was 
analyzed. He felt that selection of optimized parameters based on 
only one box size and reversal number was "undependable--that luck and 
I . 
chance selection may have played a ~ore important role than precision" 
(p. 36). Reinfelt argued that selection of parameters based on two or 
more box sizes and reversal numbers giving the same product when multi-
plied 'together would give more dependable results. It was also pointed 
out that using a too small box size and/or reversal number will be more 
apt to result in a loss than larger ones. 
Purcell (1977) stated that a "hedge everything"' strategy in an 
upward trending market negates the benefits of the higher cash prices. 
To hedge effectively, a selective approach is needed which will offer 
protection against price breaks and still allow all or part of the 
benefits of a rising cash market. Purcell suggested a technical tool, 
such as moving averages, to help call turning points in the markets. 
The performance of four selected moving average strategies for placing 
short hedges were reported for the live cattle futures market from 1965 
through 1976. The 5 and 15-day moving average strategy with a 4-day 
linearly weighted moving average resulted in the hig~est netprofit 
after commissions. It was noted that the 4-day linearly weighted mov-
ing average serves as a lead indicator and reduces some of the false 
signals. 
Brown (1977) compar~d alternative short hedging strategies for 
feeder cattle based upon both technical price analysis and price 
predictions from econometric models. Average returns were the highest 
I 
for a selective hedging strategy based only upon 5 and 10-day moving 
11 
averages. Strategies incorporating the price predictions from the 
model resulted in both smaller mean returns and larger standard devia-
tions of returns when compared with the 5 and 10-day moving average 
strategy. 
Selective long hedging of feeder cattle using moving averages 
was tested by Purcell (1978). Ninety and 180-day planning periods 
were used during the test period from January, 1972, through November, 
1977. For both the 90 and 180-day planning periods·, the 5-day, 10-day, 
and 4-day linearly weighted moving average strategy resulted in the 
highest net futures profits per head of $11.47 and $20.12, respectively. 
Purcell (1978, p. J-1) stated, "Effective use of the long hedge can 
make significant contributions to the profit position of the cattle 
feeder." 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF COMMODITY FUTURES 
PRICES AND SELECTIVE HEDGING 
Analysis of the fundamental laws of supply and demand is commonly 
used to estimate the changes in prices of commodity futures markets. 
However, these predictions are not always very accurate. There are 
times when futures price movements appear to behave differently from 
the manner suggested by the analysis of supply and demand fundamentals. 
Anticipation of market reports, daily weather changes, or market rumors 
may cause substantial price changes in commodity futures prices even 
though there has been little or no change in the supply and demand 
fundamentals. Therefore, simply knowing which way prices will likely 
be trending over time does not guarantee an effective hedging program. 
Another approach used to determine changes in commodity futures 
prices is technical price analysis. It is a study of, the market prices 
rather than the fundamental factors affecting the supply and demand for 
a given commodity. Technical price analysis is based on the assumption 
that analysis of past price behavior is useful in determining future 
price behavior. By its very nature, technical price analysis implies 
that price fluctuations are not random nor unpredictable. This is 
direct opposition with the random walk theory, proclaimed by many as 
the true theory of commodity price behavior. Support for and evidence 
against the random wa.lk theory can be found in recent research results. 
12 
13 
No definite conclusion has yet been determined. However, due to the 
implications of using technical price analysis (such as point and figure 
charts and moving averages) to develop selective hedging strategies, it 
should prove beneficial to explore the existing knowledge concerning 
the random walk theory. 
The theory of hedging itself is also far from being well esta-
blished. Many would question whether placing and lifting the hedge 
several times during the production process is "true" hedging or if it 
is really a type of futures market speculation. 
In this chapter, the theoretical considerations of commodity 
futures price behavior and selective hedging will be discussed. It 
should be pointed out, however, that no attempt will be made to present 
any new the,ories concerning these topics. 
The Random Walk Theory 
Agricultural commodities are well known for their price fluctua-
tions. The random walk theory has evolved as an attempt 'to explain 
commodity price behavior in the futures markets. The premises behind 
this theory as well as results of several researchers who have conducted 
numerous tests will be reviewed and analyzed to determine the validity 
of this theory. 
The random walk theory states that the best prediction of _ 
tomorrow's futures market price is today's futures market price, which 
rules out the possibility of any worthwhile price prediction (Cargill 
and Rausser, 1972). It implies that the use of charts or any mathe~ 
matical.device that attempts to predict future price changes by 
extrapolation of past price changes is worthless (Samuelson, 1965). 
14 
The model does not say that price changes are unpredictable if all 
available information is used; they are unpredictable using only pre-
vious price changes (Labys and Granger, 1970). 
The random walk model views a commodity futures price series as a 
signal from a generating process inherent in the nature of the market 
under consideration (Cargill and R.ausser, 1969). If Pt is the discrete 
price series generated by a random walk, then the following relation 
holds: 
where e is a sequence of random, independent numbers with zero mean t . ' 
1 
often termed white noise. If this is a correct description of price 
behavior, prices should then proceed in a series of unpredictable, 
unconnected steps. This also implies that the price series cannot con-
tain any cyclical or other deterministic components, such as a seasonal ~· 
variation (Labys and Granger, 1970). However, seasonal and cyclical 
components are known to exist in cattle price series. This suggests 
that the random walk model is a cruder approximation to the truth for 
commodity price series with deterministic components (Labys and Granger, 
1970). 
A major premise of the random walk theory is the concept of an 
efficient market (Teweles, Harlow, and Stone, 1969). It is defined as 
a market with large numbers of equally informed, actively competing 
participants attempting to maximize profits. The market price reflects 
all information that is known as well as events that are expected to 
1The term white noise is ~sed due to the analogy with the optical 
spectrum of white light, where all optical frequencies are present 
with the same intensity. 
15 
occur in the foreseeable future, and it adjusts rapidly to any new 
information. Even though disagreements will cause random discrepancies, 
actual prices will move randomly about the intrinsic value. 
From the point of view of economic theory, independence of 
successive price changes implies a theoretically efficient commodity 
market (Smidt, 1965). Samuelson (1965) illustrated that the indepen-
dence of successive price changes was consistent with the existence of 
an efficient market. 
Although an efficient market has been shown to be theoretically 
sound, its actual existence is another issue. In an empirical.study on 
corn futures prices, Larson (1960) found that over 80 percent of the 
change in corn prices due to new information occurred during the first 
day. This tends to support the concept of an efficient market. It 
should be noted, however, that all commodity futures markets might not 
be as efficient as the corn market. 
Random walk theorists agree that their model probably does not 
exactly describe the behavior of commodity prices, but believe it is 
the best explanation of price behavior thus far (Teweles, Harlow, and 
Stone, 1969). They realize that while successive price changes may 
not be strictly independent, the amount of dependence is unimportant. 
With a random walk model, the question of why trends exist must 
be explained. There are two basic ideas used to explain how an effi-
cient market and trend can coexist. 
The first is a risk-premium concept. Keynes (1930) assumed that 
a speculator who seeks to maximize profits will not become involved 
in a market in which his expected profit is zero. Hedgers offer the 
. speculator a nonzero expectation in order to transfer risk. The 
risk-premium concept implies that price trends are a normal 
characteristic of all futures markets. This theory, however, assumes 
that speculators will only establish long positions in the futures 
markets. 
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A second explanation is advanced by Gray (1960) and is referred to 
as the "market-balance" concept. He states that a significant require-
ment for balance is enough participation by speculators to offset or 
balance the hedging. Although this concept does not concede that price 
trends are necessary, it views a trend as evidence of a market imper-
fection due to lack of sufficient speculation. 
To summarize, the existence of a trend in futures prices would be 
interpreted by those who accept the risk-premium concept as simply the 
mechanism by which speculators earn a normal return; the same fact 
would be interpreted by those who accept the market-balance concept as 
indicative of insufficient mobility or barriers to entry. 
In either case, the existence of a trend does not imply that the 
level of futures prices is anticipa-tory (Smidt, 1965)·. However, a 
price trend does not exclude the possibility that changes in futures 
prices might be reliably anticipated, in the sense that changes are 
mainly appropriate responses to new information. 
Brinegar (1970) conducted a price trend study involving the corn, 
wheat, and rye futures markets• He reported that futures prices con-
tain two general kinds of "non-ideal" behavior: (1) there is a clear 
continuity tendency in longer intervals, and (2) there is a slight 
reaction tendency in shorter intervals. Although only rough measures 
could be obtained, the reaction tendency appeared to have a time inter-
val of 1 or 2 weeks, while the continuity te~dency had a time interval 
somewhere between 4 and 16 weeks. 
Brinegar's explanation for the tendency of longer intervals to 
exhibit continuity of movement conflicted with the results reported 
17 
by Larson (1960) in his study of corn prices. Brinegar (1970) believed 
that although traders, as a group, may be doing their best to foresee 
the significance of all available information, their collective abili-
ties may not measure up to the level required by an efficient market. 
Therefore, a continuity tendency is a result of the market only gradual-
ly accepting and acting upon new information, as opposed to the rapid, 
correct, and near unanimous evaluations required in an efficient market. 
If the idea that an efficient market and the notion that a trend 
can coexist in an efficient market are accepted, then the theory of 
a random walk becomes a possible explanation of commodity price behav-
ior. Several research studies have been conducted to test the validity 
of the random· walk theory. These results will now be examined. 
Houthakker (1961) conducted a study dealing with the profitability 
of stop loss orders as an indication of nonrandomness. He used corn 
and wheat futures prices in his analysis. In analyzing the stop per-
centages between 0 and 100, Houthakker cites some evidence of nonrandom-
ness, but the improvement in profits was not always large. He concluded 
that a trader could not expect a stop loss strategy, per se, no matter 
how efficiently formulated, to result in a profitable trading strategy. 
On the basis of his results, he could not reject the random walk 
hypothesis. 
Smidt (1965) t.ested a mechanical trading rule based on moving 
averages for soybeans. Profits from this trading rule were higher and 
more evenly distributed than for any other rule he had considered 
earlier. After showing that the observed profits would have been 
statistically unlikely if the price changes were not negatively 
correlated, Smidt concluded that price changes in the soybean futures 
market do not appear to behave in a random fashion. 
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Cargill and Rausser (1969) used spectral analysis to test the 
random walk hypothesis for three storeable commodities, wheat, corn, 
and oats, and one nonstoreable commodity, live beef cattle. Aside from 
a single exception, their results indicated that a very simply sto-
chastic mechanism is consistent with the actual behavior of the daily 
futures prices for these actively traded commodities. They could not 
reject the random walk hypothesis. 
They noted that futures markets are characterized by a large 
number of individuals continually predicting prices, in which the best 
predictive model assumes that the price at the next moment is the same 
as the present price plus a random element, i.e. a random walk. New 
information entering the market regarding weather conditions, spot 
prices, national income, or existing inventory levels would appear to 
emerge randomly and impart a similar random movement in futures prices. 
Later, in 1972, Cargill and Rausser (1972) conducted a ~imilar 
study but included more statistical procedures and added more commodi-
ties. Three approaches, serial correlation analysis, spectral density 
analysis, and integrated periodogram analysis were used to test the 
. hypothesis of random walk behavior in the commodity futures markets. 
Nearly 170 futures contracts representing seven agricultural commodi-
ties and copper were used in the investigation. In each of the three 
tests, a substantial number of contracts appeared nonrandom. They re-
jected the random walk theory of price behavior and believed that the 
use of a larger number of contracts was the primary reason for obtain-
ing different results in this study and their earlier one. 
Cargill and Rausser (1975) did further research on this subject 
which included both statistical and mechanical testing procedures and 
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a larger sample size. Simple and sophisticated tests of serial corre-
lation were used on the daily price changes of 464 commodity contracts. 
Six agricultural commodities and copper were examined. Their results 
clearly showed that the random walk model must be rejected as a realis-
tlc description of commodity markets. They noted that both statistical 
and mechanical testing procedures should be used, but that the applica-
tion of simple mechanical filters produced results which were difficult 
to assess on a statistical basis since probability statements could not 
be made as to whether generated profits were significantly different 
from what would be obtained by applying the same filter to a random 
series. 
Stevenson and Bear (1970) applied various tests of probability 
distributions, serial correlations, and run analyses in addition to 
mechanical filters to test the validity of the random walk theory of 
corn and soybean futures markets. They concluded that the random walk 
theory did not offer a satisfactory explanation of these price series. 
Specifically, they found a tendency for negative dependence in short 
periods of time and positive dependence over longer periods of time. 
Not only were these characteristics recognizable, but also the long-
term segments were profitable under certain mechanical trading rules 
throughout the period of the study, both in an absolute sense and with 
respect to a buy and hold policy. 
They also validated the existence of long-term trends but stated 
this in itself did not contradict the random walk theory. However, 
t;he relatively high profitability of the long-term mechanical filters 
casted considerable doubt on the applicability of this theory in the 
commodity futures markets. 
20 
Leuthold (1972) investigated the short run fluctuations of the 
live beef cattle futures market. Spectral analysis indicated that a 
simple stochastic process was consistent with live beef cattle futures 
price behavior part of the time, but not at other times. He also used 
mechanical filters to test the same data. The results from these tests 
caused Leuthold to reject the idea that live beef cattle futures prices 
behave in random fashion. 
In summary, current research findings using improved testing 
techniques and methods cast serious doubts concerning the random walk 
theory of commodity futures price behavior. Sufficient evidence has 
been found to support the idea that future price changes are dependent 
upon past price changes, and therefore, past price$may be reliable 
indicators of futures prices. Rejection of the random walk theory per-
mits explanations of price behavior which seem closer to reality than 
the risk-premium or market-balance concepts. The concept of an effi-
cient market is no longer necessary to explain actual market behavior, 
which implies a more gradual acceptance of information as opposed to 
rapid, nearly unanimous interpretations of new information. 
Rejection of the random walk hypothesis permits charting, 
mathematical models, and other technical devices using past price 
information as methods to predict future price changes. 
If the random walk theory is accepted, any attempt to use a 
selective hedging strategy based on technical price analysis should 
consistently result in decreased futures market profits when compared 
to the classical hedging strategy of taking a position and never 
changing it. 
Now that the implications of technical price analysis have been 
explored, it needs to be determined if any justification exists for 
selective hedging strategies. 
Objectives of Selective Hedging 
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Reduction of price risk has been the conventional purpose of 
hedging expressed in most of the economic literature, particularly in 
earlier writings (Hardy and Lyon, 1923; Stevens, 1929). If this is 
the sole purpose of hedging, no real decision making is required of 
the hedger. All he simply needs to do is take an opposite but equal 
position in the futures market from the time the production process 
begins until it ends. There would never be any reason or need to lift 
the hedge. 
Working (1953a) was perhaps the first to for:mally express a , 
different view of hedging. He felt that role of risk avoidance in 
most hedging had been greatly overemphasized in economic discussions. 
Instead, most hedging was done purely as logical reasoning from avail-
able information concerning prices and other economic factors rather 
than any desire to minimize risk. If the producer could afford to 
take the risk and was fairly confident of rising prices, Working could 
see no reason why the producer should want to hedge. 
Working (1953b, p. 561) reaffirmed his position on hedging in ano-
ther article. He stated that " •• , any curtailment of risk may be only 
incidental advantage gained, not a primary or even a very important 
incentive to hedging." He also added that when hedging is 
practiced systematically, there is no need to consider whether the 
absolute level of the price is favorable. 
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Gray (1961) also accepted Working's view that risk reduction is 
not an important motivating force in hedging in many cases. His view-
point was based on the lack of adequate evidence supporting a risk 
premium in commodity futures prices. 
Telser (1955) examined entrepreneurial behavior under uncertainty 
and its implications on hedging. He pointed out that an entrepreneur 
may choose to accept a higher degree of risk for a higher expected net 
profit. 
This idea of a trade-off between risk and expected return for a 
hedger was also presented by Johnson (1960). He stated there was 
no distinction between the hedger and the "ordinary" speculator insofar 
as both are motivated by a desire to obtain an optimum combination of 
risk and expected return as .determined by their respective utility 
functions. Other writers have also indicated that hedgers consider 
both expected returns and risks when making their hedging decisions 
(Cootner, 1967; Peck, 1975). 
With these points in mind, it seems only natural that a hedger 
who is willing to substitute between risk reduction and expected 
return would formulate a selective hedging strategy rather than a 
"hedge and hold" strategy. He would want to place the hedge if he 
felt it was illogical to bear the price risk. Likewise, he would be 
willing to accept the price risk, i.e. lift the hedge, if he felt it 
was logical to do so. 
In the remainder of this thesis, the theories and applications 
of technical price analysis and selective hedging will be combined to 
develop selective hedging strategies for feeder cattle. 
CHAPTER III 
OPTIMIZATION OF POINT AND FIGURE CHART PARAMETERS 
FOR THE FEEDER CATTLE FUTURES MARKET 
Determining the proper time to place and lift hedges is a real 
problem for a feeder cattle producer or a cattle feeder whose primary 
-
goal is to obtain a more favorable price for feeder cattle. Point and 
figure charting is one potential method available for developing such 
a selective hedging strategy. Neither knowledge of econometric models 
and statistics nor sophisticated equipment is needed. The only data 
required is each day.~ s high and low prices for the appropriate feeder 
cattle futures contract. With a little practice, nearly anyone can 
become a skilled point and figure chartist. 
This chapter involves the optimization of point and figure chart 
parameters for feeder cattle. The first part of the chapte:r covers the 
point and figure charting technique itself. The procedure used to 
obtain the results is discussed in the next part, followed by a section 
in which the results are analyzed. The final part gives a summary of 
the entire chapter. 
The Point and Figure Charting Technique 
The only information needed for point and figure charting is the 
direction and magnitude of price changes. Unlike bar charts, this 
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technique ignores trading volume and open interest, and the price 
changes are plotted independently of time. An excellent illustration 
and discussion on the mechanics of point and figure charting are given 
in Cohen (1972). 
X's are used to plot upward moving prices while O's are used to 
plot downward moving prices. The vertical columns of X's and O's alter-
nate. The plotting is moved one column to the right each time a price 
reversal occurs. X's and O's can never appear in the same column since 
each column represents either an upmove or a downmove; it cannot repre-
sent both. With this charting technique, daily highs and lows are used 
for determining changes in the price movement and not the closing 
prices. 
To illustrate the construction of a point and figure chart, consi-
der the price data.in Table II relating to the May 1977 Feeder Cattle 
contract traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Using a piece of 
conveniently ruled graph paper, construct a price scale along the 
vertical axis corresponding to the box size chosen. This example will 
use a $.20 box size and a three box reversal. 
Starting with April 7, place X's in the boxes representing $43.00, 
$43.20, $43.40, and $43.60 (Figure 2). Since the low of the day did 
not go to $42.80, no entry was made in this box; and since the daily 
high did not reach $43.80, no entry was made in that box. 
On April 11 the high is checked to see if a ne~ high was made 
since X's were plotted last. A new high of $43.92 was made so an X 
was entered in the $43.80 qox. On April 12 neither a new high nor a 
new low was made so no entries were made on this date. A new high of 
$44.70 was made on the following day so four more X's were plotted up 
Date 
April 7 
8 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
18 
TABLE II 
PRICE DATA FOR THE MAY, 1977, FEEDER CATTLE CONTRACT, 
APRIL 7, 1977-APRIL 18, 1977, IN 
DOLLARS PER CWT • 
High 
43.67 
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Low 
42.90 
Market Closed Good Friday 
43.92 43.35 
43.80 43.35 
44.70 43.85 
44.62 44.00 
45.00 43.90 
45.30 44.75 
44 
43 
: i 
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Figure 2. A $. 20 x 3 Point and 
Figure Chart 
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through the $44.60 box. The lows are ignored as long as ,X's are being 
plotted. 
On April 14 the contract failed to make a new high. The low is 
then checked, and it is noted that the difference between the previous 
high plotted and the low price is ($44.60 - $44.00) = $.60. This repre-
sents a change in direction of the trend of exactly the three box mini-
mum. An entry. is made in the form of O's one column to the right and 
one box below the highest box plotted so that three O's are entered. 
On April 15 the low is checked and although a new low was made, it 
did not represent enough of a decrease to warrant a new entry. The 
high is then checked, and it represents a change in trend of more than 
three boxes, i.e, $45.00-44.00 = $1. 00. Therefore, a new series of 
five X's are plotted one column to the right and one box above the last 
0 entry. On April 18 the uptrend was continued and one more X was 
plotted in the $45.20 box to depict the move to the new high of $45.30. 
Plotting of the price data continues in this manner for each day's 
data as long as the contract is traded, and can be summarized by the 
following rules: 
L If the last chart entry is an X, then look at the daily 
high. If the price has gone up, enter the additional X 
or X's and forget about the lows. If the price has not 
gone up enough to enter any X's, then look at the low 
price for a reversal. 
2. If the last chart entry is an 0, then look at the daily 
low. If the price has gone lower, enter the additional 
0 or O's and forget about the highs. If the price has 
not gone down enough to enter any O's, then look at the 
high price for a reversal. 
Procedure 
The data set consisted of 18 feeder cattle futures contracts. The 
March, May, and October contracts were used, beginning with the 1972 
28 
contract year and ending with the 1977 contract year. These delivery 
months were selected as the most representative of all the delivery 
months due t.o their relatively high trading volumes. 
Although many distinct point and figure chart formations exist, 
only the breakouts of double top and double bottom formations were 
recognized for the buy and sell signals (Figure 3). The size of the 
open position was limited to only one 42,000 pound contract for each 
delivery month at any point in time. Observation of the individual 
charts did not indicate any potential increases in net profits from 
honoring more complex formations. Also, the double top and double 
bottom formations are more easily recognized by inexperienced point and 
figure chartists. 
The daily high and low prices were used in construction of the 
point and figure charts. This is the procedure normally used. A few 
tests were conducted using only the opening, high, low, or closing 
prices. However, none of these alternatives increased total net profits 
over the high-low price combination. 
For this optimization process, optimal was defined as that 
combination of box size and reversal number yielding the highest profits 
for the entire set of 18 contracts, after charges for commission of 
1 $50.00 per trade. No charges were included for interest on margin 
money. This definition was considered to be the most consistent for a 
selective hedger with a primary objective of a more favorable price. 
Each of eight box sizes from $.05 to $.40 in $.05 multiplies was 
tested with reversal numbers .from one to five inclusive. The $.05 
1The commission fee of $50.00 per trade was arbitrarily selected 
and will vary with the brokerage firm. 
r-rrr··rrr 
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DOUBLE TOP FORMATION DOUBLE BOTTOM FORMATION 
Figure 3. Formations for Buy and Sell Signals on 
Point and Figure Charts 
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hox size was also tested with a six box reversal, giving a total of 41 
different box size-reversal number combinations. Testing of additional 
parameter combinations did not appear promising. 
To keep this simulation realistic, certain trading rules were 
imposed: 
1. No trades were transacted on days when the high and low 
prices were equal, assuming no trading occurred for this 
contract on this day. 
2. No trades were allowed when the transaction price was equal 
to a limit move price. 
3. If the price range gapped above or below a buy or sell 
signal respectively, the closing price was used unless 
it was a limit move price. In such cases, no trades 
were transacted on this day. 
4. Due to the threat of delivery, no new buy signals were 
honored- after the first of the delivery month. 
Use of these rules -significantly decreased the amount of total net 
profit, especially for the contracts in 1973 and 1974 when limit moves 
occurred frequently. 
Analysis of Results 
Table III reports the results of the 41 different box size-
reversal number combinations. The greatest total net profit occurred 
with a $. 05 box size and a five box interval. However, the top five-
ranking parameter combinations were relatively close, all having total 
net profits greater than $54,000. Most of this profit was not the 
result of a single unusual year (Table IV). Many of the better parame-
ter combinations had profits in excess of $10,000 in· three of the six 
years. 
Reinfeld (1977) suggested that the selection of optimal parameters 
for point and figure charts should be based on the profits from more 
Reversal 
Box Size Distance 
in $/cwt. in Boxes 
• 05 1 
• 05 2 
.05 3 
. 05 4 
.05 5 
.05 6 
.10 1 
.10 2 
.10 3 
.10 4 
.10 5 
.15 1 
.15 2 
.15 3 
.15 4 
.15 5 
.20 1 
.20 2 
.20 3 
.20 4 
.20 5 
TABLE III 
NET PROFITS IN DOLLARS FROM THE FEEDER CATTLE FUTURES MARKET 
USING POINT AND FIGURE CHARTS, 1972-1977 
Net Prof its Net Profits ' . Total Rank Based Total 
from from Net on Total Number 
Long Trades Short Trades Profits Net Profits of Trades 
28,328 23,171 51,499 10 272 
28,906 24,001 52,907 8 262 
28,439 23,025 51,464 11 256 
30,348 25,257 55,605 3 245 
30,837 25,767 56,604 1 235 
29,895 24,405 54,300 5 229 
28,098 23,033 51,131 12 266 
29,108 23,913 53,021 6 245 
29,226 23,757 52,983 7 223 
26,212 21,950 48,162 15 214 
25,410 20,854 46,264 17 194 
30,457 25,616 56,0:73 2 251 
28,209 23,489 51,698 9 - 224 
25,143 20,220 45,363 18 199 
25,010 22,679 47,689 16 166 
20,129 19,179 39,308 25 140 
29,778 24,839 54,617 4 234 
26,667 22,320 48,987 13 198 
22,528 18,700 41,228 21 162 
19,995 20,502 40,497 23 119 
11,205 12,334 23,539 31 101 
Percent 
Profitable 
Trades 
41.2 
41.6 
41.8 
43.3 
44.7 
44.5 
42.7 
43.7 
44.4 
44.4 
45.9 
45.0 
46.4 
45.7 
48.8 
47.1 
43.6 
44.9 
45.1 
47.9 w 1-' 
46.5 
TABLE III (Continued) 
Reversal Net Profits Net Profits Total Rank Based Total Percent 
Box Size Distance from from Net on Total Number Profitable 
'in $/cwt. in Boxes Long Trades 'Short Trades PrOfits Net Profits of Trades Trades 
.25 1 24,255 19,859 44,114 20 235 43.8 
;25 2 22,640 17,739 40,379 24 181 44.8 7 
.25 3 20,296 17,406 37,702 27 135 47.4 
.25 4 10,273 10,302 20,575 32 105 54~7 
.25 5 5,938 10,007 15,945 33 79 46.8 
.30 1 21,915 17,279 39,194 26 212 43.4 
.30 2 24,153 20,941 45,094 19 146 46.6 
• 30 3 11,823 12,806 24,629 30 106 46.2 
.30 4 3,859 6,681 10,540 35 81 44.4 
.30 5 -5,455 423 
-5,03t 40 62 37.1 
.35 1 22,893 18,319 41,212 22 184 45.1 
.35 2 17,585 18,062 35,647 28 120 46.7 
.35 3 4,197 8,804 13 '001 34 90 43.3 
.35 4 -810 5,366 4,556 36 63 44.4 
• 35 5 -8,326 -226 -8,.552 41 37.5 
.40 1 25,867 22,443 48,310 14 164 45.7 
.40 2 14,722 12,146 26,868 29 108 48.1 
.40 3 -4,050 2,281 -1,769 38 72 37.5 
.40 4 -5,625 3,175 -2,450 39 48 39.6 
.40 5 -2,260 3,005 745 37 37 35.1 
w 
!>.) 
TABLE IV 
YEARLY DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS IN DOLLARS FROM SELECTED 
POINT AND FIGURE CHART PARAMETERS, 1972-1977 
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Parameters 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Average 
.05x5 5,637 17,477 17,552 2,866 11,318 1,754 9,434 
.1Sx1 4,177 14,846 19,878 -361 12~151 5,382 9,346 
.40xl 3,099 12,710 16,554 4,908 13,263 -2,224 8,052 
.20x3 2,973 14,283 16,512 3,745 8,333 -4,618 6,871 
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than one box size and reversal number combination. He used the average 
profit based on two or more parameter combinations having the same 
product of box size and reversal number (B x R) when multiplied together, 
e.g. the average profit of the $.05 x 5 and the $.25 x 1 parameter com-
binations. He also used the average profit of grouped parameter pro-
ducts, e.g. the average profit from a group of parameter combinations 
with a B x R product from $.40 to $.50. However, these techniques did 
not add any new information nor did they aid in selection of the opti-
mized parameters for feeder cattle as shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
Neither of these curves came close to resembling the normal curve 
hypothesized by Reinfeld (1977). The curve based on the average 
profits of two or more parameter combinations having the same B x R 
was downward sloping over the entire range of B x R values (Figure 4). 
The curve with the grouped B x R did not reach a maximum either 
although it did .flatten out for grouped B x R values between $.00 and 
$.20 (Figure 5). 
In general, for any given box size, net profits decreased as the 
reversal number increased (Table III). Also, out of the top 15 
combinations, only one combination, the $.40 x 1, had a box size 
greater than $.20. Clearly, the better parameter combinations tended 
to be the ones having both a small box size and a small reversal 
number. As might be expected, these parameter combinations also pro-
duced a larger number of trades, but the percent of profitable trades 
was not noticeably affected. Even though the number of false signals 
was apparently increased, the small box sizes and reversal numbers 
generally resulted in s smaller loss for each of the false signals. 
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Figure 4. The Average Profit Curve of the Feeder Cattle 
Futures Market Based on Two or More Box 
Size and Reversal Number Combinations 
Having Equal Products, 1972-1977 
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Figure 5. The Average Profit Curve of the'Feeder Cattle 
Futures Market Based on the Product of Box 
Size and Reversal Number Grouped in 
$ .10/cwt. Increments, 1972-1977 
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Net profits from long trades were greater than net profits from 
short trades for the better parameter combinations, even though the 
number of short and long trades were about equal. The reverse was true 
for those parameter combinations having low or negative total net 
profits. 
None of the parameter combinations tested had high reliability as in-
dicated by the percentage of profitable trades (Table III). An increase 
in the percent of profitable trades did not accompany those parameter 
combinations yielding higher total net profits. It seems that the 
percent of profitable trades is not a useful criterion for optimizing 
over long time periods. 
The standard $.20 box size and three box reversal commonly used 
for live cattle (Zieg and Kaufman, 1974) gave fair results. The $.40 
x 1 combination, used by at least one chart service for live cattle, 
had somewhat larger profits. However, many of the smaller box sizes 
and reversal numbers performed even better (Table III). 
Zieg and Kaufman (1974) reported a $.30 x 3 as being the optimal 
combination for live cattle. This parameter set performed rather 
poorly over the entire six year period for feeder cattle. However, it 
should be remembered that Zieg and Kaufman used only a 135 trading 
day period for their study. 
Therefore, if a relatively short time span is used to optimize 
the parameters, it appears that the parameters need to be periodically 
re-optimized. Use of a longer time period seems to eliminate this 
need. 
It was evident during the six year time period that larger box 
sizes and reversal numbers gave better results for some of the contracts. 
For example, in 1975 both the $.40 x 1 and the $.20 x 3 chart 
parameters were definitely superior to either the $.05 x 5 or the 
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$.15 x 1 (Table IV). An attempt was made to find a variable that 
would indicate when the parameters needed to be re-optimized. The two 
possibilities examined were the variance of the closing prices and the 
variance of the daily ranges between the high and low prices. Neither 
of these produced satisfactory results. 
The main problem is finding a variable which indicates a need to 
change parameters before instead of after low profits have occurred. 
Re-optimizing parameters after a contract has produced low or negative 
profits does not guarantee that the new re-optimized parameters will 
work the best on the next contract. Furthermore, continual re-
optimization would require access to a computer and involve consider-
able time and expense. 
As mentioned earlier, parameters which kept the losses small on 
the losing trades produced the best results. This indicated that use 
of stops might prove helpful. Due to their ranking (Table II) or 
common use, the parameter combinations selected for testing with stops 
were the $.05 x 5, $.15 x 1, $.20 x 1, $.20 x 3, and $.40 x 1. These 
results will now be discussed. 
Results from Using an Ordinary Stop 
Various siz~s of stops were tested for each of the selected 
parameter combinations until a maximum total net profit was obtained. 
Whenever the price moved a specific amount against the entry price, 
the trade was "stopped out" at that specified price. For example, if 
a $1.00 stop was specified and a long position was established at 
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$38.00, the position was automatically closed out at $37.00 if the price 
ever fell to $37.00 or lower. If the daily price range gapped above or 
below the stop price, then the closing price was used to close out the 
open position. 
Incorporation of a stop increased total net profits for each of the 
selected parameter combinations except for the $.05 x 5 combination 
(Table V). In all cases, the most profitable size of stop resulted in 
a large percentage of the trades being stopped out. Use of the stop 
also increased the total number of trades. Another noticeable result 
was that most of the increase in total net profits was due to increased 
profits from the long trades. In fact, net profits from the short 
trades was decreased with some of the stops. 
The $.20 x 3 combination was helped the most by use of the stop. 
Total net profits.were increased by nearly $5,000 for a 12 percent in-
crease using a $0.00 stop (Table V). A $0.00 stop meant that any time 
a price occurred after a three box reversal which resulted in a negative 
equity balance, the position was closed out. 
No definite pattern was evident concerning the size of the optimal 
stops. For example, a $.30 stop was optimal for the $.15 x 1 parameter 
combination while a $. 7 5 stop was optimal for the $. 20 x 1 combination 
(Table V). Also, the effectiveness of the stop differed greatly among 
the selected parameter combinations tested. 
Results from Using a Trailing Stop 
The trailing stop was based on the top X plotted in each X column 
occurring after a buy signal and based on the lowest 0 plotted in each 
0 column occuring after a sell signal. For example, assume a long 
Reversal 
Box Size Distance 
in $/cwt. in Boxes 
.05 5 
.05 5 
. 05 5 
.15 1 
.15 1 
.15 1 
. 20 1 
.20 1 
.30 1 
.20 3 
.20 3 
.20 3 
.40 1 
.40 1 
. 40 1 
aDenotes maximum 
TABLE V 
NET PROFITS IN DOLLARS FROM THE FEEDER CATTLE FUTLqrns 
MARKET USING POINT AND FIGURE CHARTS 
WITH STOPS, 1972-1977 
Size Net Profits Net Proftts Total Total 
of Stop from from Net Number 
in $/cwt. Long Trades Short Trades Profits of Trades 
.60 30,785 24,343 55,128 272 
.65 30,751 24,640 55,39la 267 
.70 30,901 24,446 55,347 262 
.25 .36' 126 23,274 59,400 317 
.30 35' 131 24,657 59,788a 310 
.35 34,765 23,418 58,183 310 
.70 32,642 25,038 57,680 257 
.75 31,831 27,417 59,248a 251 
.80 31,788 26,473 58,261 250 
.00 27,154 18,866 46,020a 223 
.05 27,069 18,488 45,557 222 
.10 26,376 18,106 44,482 222 
1.10 27,436 24,469 51,905 173 
1.15 28,228 24,415 52,643a 171 
1.20 27,745 24,226 51,971 171 
Percent 
Profitable 
Trades 
36.4 
37.1 
38.2 
33.4 
34.5 
34.8 
38.5 
39.4 
39.6 
30.0 
28.8 
28.8 
42.2 
42.7 
42.7 
total net profits for each box size-reversal number combination. 
Percent of 
Trades 
Stopped Out 
50.7 
48.7 
46.6 
64.0 
62.3 
60.0 
47.1 
43.8 
43.2 
71.7 
70.3 
70.3 
39.9 
37.4 
37.4 
l:--
0 
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position was established at $39.40 when a breakout of a double top 
fonnation occurred as shown by A in Figure 6. With a $1.00/cwt. trail-
ing stop, this position was automatically stopped out at $42.00 as 
indicated by B in Figure 6 which is exactly $1.00 lower than the value 
of the top X plotted in the preceding X column, i.e. $43.00. With this 
trailing stop, it was possible for ~ trade to be stopped out with a 
positive profit. 
The'same parameter combinations selected for testing the ordinary 
stop were also used for testing the trailing stop. Use of the trailing 
stop increased the total net profits for each of the selected parameter 
combinations (Table VI) when compared with the total net profits in 
Table III. However, the only substantial increase in total net profits 
occurred with the $.40 x 1 combination. 
Generally, most of the increase in total net profits was due to 
increases in net profits from the short trades. This result was oppo-
site that for the ordinary stop. One exception was the $.40 x 1 combi-
nation which had considerably greater improvement in net profits from 
the long trades (Table VI). 
The trailing stop also increased the total number of trades. A 
large percentage of these trades were stopped out using the optimal 
size of trailing stop, but the final total net profit figure was 
always increased. For example, total net profits for the $.40 x 1 com-
bination were increased by over $9,000 even though 64 percent of the 
trades were stopped out with a $1.45 trailing stop. 
Unlike the ordinary stop, the optimal size of trailing stop fell 
within a rather narrow range of $1.40 to $1.50. Deviations of $.05 
$/cwt. 
A. Buy signal at $39.40 
B. Long position stopped out at $42.00 
C. Sell signal at $40.80 
D. Short position stopped out at $39.40 
E. Buy signal at $39.80 
Figure 6. Example of a $1.00 Trailing Stop 
Used with a $.20 x 1 Point and 
Figure Chart 
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Box Size 
in $/cwt. 
.OS 
.05 
.05 
.15 
.15 
.15 
.20 
.20 
.20 
.20 
.20 
.20 
.40 
.40 
.40 
T~LE VI 
NET PROFITS IN DOLLARS FROM THE FEEDER CATTLE FUTURES MARKET USING 
POINT AND FIGURE CHARTS WITH TRAILING STOPS, 1972-1977 
Reversal Size Net Profits Net Profits Total Total Percent 
Distance of Stop from from Net Number Profitable 
in Boxes in $/cwt. Long Trades Short Trades Profits of Trades Trades 
5 1.45 31,127 28,134 59,261 260 43.1 
5 1. 50 31,232 28,667 59,899a 259 42.9 
5 1.55 32,453 26,545 59,998 255 44.3 
1 1.35 30,634 27,108 57,742 276 44.6 
1 1.40 31,162 26,864 58,026a 273 43.2 
1. 1.45 30,990 26,528 57,518 272 43.4 
1 1.35 29,291 27,071 56,362 260 43.8 
1 1.40 30,982 25,895 56,877a 256 43.8 
1 1.45 30,524 25,790 56,314 255 44.3 
3 1.40 23,889 19,865 43,754 124 46.8 
3 1.45 23,108 21,619 44,727a 119 48.7 
3 1. 50 22,982 20,422 43,404 119 47.1 
1 1.40 30,876 22,980 53,967 183 46.4 
1 1.45 32,053 25,566 57,619a 178 48.3 
1 1.50 30,751 25,188 55,939 178 46.1 
aDenotes maximum total net profits for each box size-reversal number combination. 
Percent of 
Trades 
Stopped Out 
52.7 
49.4 
48.6 
48.6 
45.8 
42.3 
54.6 
51.6 
46.7 
75.0 
71.4 
64.7 
68.3 
63.5 
61.8 
..,.. 
w 
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on either side of the optimal value of the trailing stop for each 
parameter combination did not greatly reduce the profitability 
(Table VI),. 
Sunnnary 
Optimized parameter combinations for feeder cattle point and 
figure charts significantly increased total net profits over the stan-
dard $.20 box size and three box reversal. Incorporation of both an 
ordinary stop and a trailing stop also increased total net profits 
in most cases although the increase was not ususally substantial. The 
general pattern which emerged was that the most profitable parameters 
were the ones most reactive to price changes. Although these reactive 
.. 
parameters generated a large number of trades, they tended to minimize 
the losses of the unprofitable trades, resulting in a larger total 
net profit. 
The results obtained from this optimization process also indicate 
that point and figure charts definitely have potential use in the devel-
oprnent of selective hedging strategies for feeder cattle. Since there 
were only slight differences in the total net profits for many of the 
top parameter combinations both with and without stops, it appears that 
the hedger seeking a more favorable price may select a parameter corn-
bination suited to his own individual preference from a wide variety 
of feasible parameter combinations. 
CHAPTER IV 
OPTIMIZATION OF MOVING AVERAGE PARAMETERS FOR 
THE FEEDER CATTLE FUTURES MARKET 
Moving averages are another technical price analysis tool which 
can assist the feeder cattle hedger in deciding when to place and lift 
hedges. As with point and figure charting, moving averages are an 
objective or mechanical device free from the user's emotions or sub-
jective judgments. Moving averages are simple to use, requiring no 
knowledge of statistics or econometric models, and an inexpensive cal-
culator can handle all the necessary computations. No extensive data 
is needed since normally only the closing prices of the appropriate, 
., 
feeder cattle futures contract are used in the calculation of the moving 
averages. 
Because of these desirable characteristics, selective hedging 
strategies based on moving averages should initially appeal to feeder 
cattle hedgers. However, the real satisfaction from any selective 
hedging device depends on its ability to aid the hedger in obtaining 
a more favorable price. It seems desirable, therefore, to extensively 
examine many various combinations of moving averages to determine the 
ones which will most likely achieve this goal of a more favorable 
price. 
This chapter involves the optimization of moving average 
parameters for the feeder cattle futures market. The first part 
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discusses the moving average technique itself. The next part covers 
the testing. procedure used. The results are analyzed in the third 
section, followed by a summary of the entire chapter. 
The Moving Average Technique 
Moving averages are a trend-following method of technical price 
analysis. Trading strategies using moving averages are based on the 
principle of buying strength and selling weakness. 
A moving average of prices is a progressive average in which the 
number of prices used, as indicated by the divisor, remain~ the same, 
but a new price is added to the end of the series at periodic intervals, 
e.g. daily, as a price is simultaneously dropped from the beginning 
of the series. Va.rious weighting schemes can also be used in connec-
tion with a moving average. A linear weighting scheme. consists of 
giving the oldest price in the series a weight of one, and then adding 
one to the weight for the next oldest price in the series. This pro-
cess continues in similar manner with the most recent price having the 
largest weight which is equal to the number of prices in the moving 
average. The divisor for a linearly weighted moving average would be 
the sum of the weights instead of the number of prices in the series. 1 
1To illustrate how a 4-day linear weighted moving is calculated, 
let t be the day of the most recent closing price. The 4-day weighted 
moving average is then calculated as follows: 
Day Closing Price Weight Product 
t 49.00 4 196.00 
t-1 48.50 3 145.50 
t-2 48.00 2 96.00 
t-3 48.00 1 48.00 
10 485.50 
The 4-day weight average is 485.50 t 10 = 48.55. 
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Buy and sell signals are generated by the 11 crossing action 11 of the 
moving averages when more than one time length is used. Technically 
speaking, the crossing action generates the trading signals even if only 
one length of moving average is used. If this is the case, the other 
moving average is implicitly assumed to be a 11one-day 11 moving average, 
i.e. the daily closing price. 
On any day when the shorter length moving average crosses the 
longer length moving average from above, a downward trend in price 
is indicated which generates a sell signal. Similarly, when the 
shorter length moving average crosses the longer length moving average 
from below, an upward trend in price is indicated, resulting in a buy 
signal. Figure 7 illustrates the movement and crossing action of two 
moving averages.· 
Buy and sell signals are generated in the same manner when three 
moving averages are used. In Figure 8 a buy signal is indicated when 
the 4-day weighted leads the 5-day, and the 5-day is above the 10-day. 
The.responsive 4-day weighted moving average confirms the crossing ac-
tion of the other two moving averages, and thus eliminates some of the 
false signals. A sell signal is generated when the 4-day weighted is 
below the 5-day which must also be below the 10-day. 
An important trade-off is involved.in determining the length of 
time to use in computing the moving averages. The shorter the length 
of time, the more sensitive the moving average will be to any change in 
the price trend .. New positions will be established quicker. However, 
the shorter the length of the moving average, the larger the number of 
trades that will be made. This results in a greater number of whipsaw 
losses and more commission expense. A longer length of time used to 
; 
Price 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
-------- 3-day moving average 
---------- 10-day moving average 
Up Trend 
Indicated Here 
(Buy Signal) 
' ...... 
Down Trend 
Indica ted Her~ 
(Sell Signal) ', 
................ 
Time 
Figure 7. Illustration of Crossing Action of Two 
Moving Averages 
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Pric 
Signal 
Sell Signal 
4w fails to confirm 
the 11 sell signal11 
0-day 
4w 
Time 
Figure 8. Illustration of Buy and Sell Signals from 
Three Moving Averages 
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calculate the moving average will decrease the number of trades and 
~tipsnw losses but will he slower to signal changes in price trends. 
[n thi.s case, much of the price move can already occur before a change 
in trend is signaled. 
A penetration rule can be used to reduce the number of false 
signals. For instance, waiting for the moving averages to cross or 
penetrate each other by $.05 or more per cwt. would eliminate some of 
the whipsaw losses. A penetration rule is subject to the same limita-
tions as described earlier. Too small a penetration will do little 
towards reducing the number of false signals. Too large a penetration 
will decrease the profits on the successful signals. 
The successfulness of moving averages will depend largely upon the 
lengths of time used in calculating the moving averages as well as the 
amount of pen~tration required. The remainder of this chapter will be 
devoted to the task of determining the optimum moving average parameters. 
Procedure 
The same basic procedure used to optimize the point and figure 
chart parameters was also used in optimizing the moving average parame-
ters. The same 18 feeder cattle contracts were used. The size of the 
open position was limited to only one 42,000 pound contract for each de-
livery month at any point in time. The closing prices were used to cal-
culate the moving averages, and trades were transacted on the same day 
the moving averages crossed. 
For this optimization process, optimal was defined as that 
combination of moving average parameters yielding the highest profits 
for the entire set of 18 contracts, after charges for commission of 
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$50.00 per trade. No charges were deducted for interest on margin 
money. As stated in the previous chapter, this definition of optimal-
ity was considered to be the most consistent for a selective hedger 
with a primary objective of a more favorable price. 
Since no formal theory exists on the optimization of moving aver-
age parameters, a systematic search procedure was employed. Because 
of the infinite number of possible moving average combinations, no 
guarantee exists that the most profitable combination was even tested. 
However, each of the most promising combinations was varied only 
slightly in repetitive tests until increases in the total net profit 
figure could not be obtained. 
To keep this trading simulation realistic, certain trading rules 
were imposed: 
1. No trades were transacted on days when the high and low 
prices were equal, assuming no trading occurred for this 
contract on this day. 
2. No trades were transacted on days when the closing price 
was up or down the daily limit. 
3. Due to the threat of delivery, no new buy signals were. 
honored after the first of' the delivery month. 
Use of these rules substantially reduced the amount of total net 
profit as was the case with the point and figure charts. 
Analysis of Results 
Three basic variations using moving averages were tested: single 
moving averages and combinations of two and three moving averages. 
Penetration rules and a. linear weighting scheme were also tested with 
certain selected moving average combination~. 
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The results of the single moving averages are contained in 
Table VII. Not surprisingly, only about one t~ird of the total number 
of trades were profitable without using any penetration rule with these 
single moving averages. In all cases, the net profits from the long 
trades were always greater than the net profits from the short trades. 
The 14-day moving average had the highest total net profits while the 
most profitable linearly weighted moving average was the 15-day weighted 
average. 
The linearly weighted moving averages were more reactive to price 
changes as indicated by the increased total number of trades; however, 
there was also a corresponding increase in the number of false signals. 
As a result of the trade-off between sensitivity and the number of false 
signals, the differences in total net profits were not significantly 
large between the·weighted and non-weighted single moving averages. 
Minimum. penetrations of $.05 and $.10 per cwt. were tested with 
the 14-day and 15-day weighted moving averages (Table VII). Although 
the percent of profitable trades was increased somewhat, the total net 
profits of only the 14-day moving average were increased. 
On the basis of total net profits, the single moving averages 
did not perform that poorly. It was evident, however, that decreasing 
the number of false signals would·do the most to increase total net 
profits. The most obvious method to correct this problem was to in-
clude another moving average. 
Table VIII contains the results of various combinations of two 
moving averages. As expected, the percentage of profitable trades was 
increased by combining two moving averages, and the total number of 
trades was generally reduced. As a group, the total net profits were 
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TABLE VII 
NET PROFITS IN DOLLARS FROM THE FEEDER CATTLE FUTURES MARKET 
USING A SINGLE MOVING AVERAGE, 1972-1977 
Length of Net Profits Net Profits Total Total Percent 
Moving from from Net Number Profitable 
a Long Trades Short Trades Profits of Trades Trades Average 
12 23,405 15,714 39,119 307 34.5 
13 22,177 15,115 37,292 296 33.8 
14 26,900 18,859 45,759 286 34.3 
15 27,414 17,471 44,885 275 34.2 
16 24,965 16,431 41,396 266 33.8 
12w 23,487 18,034 41,521 379 31.9 
13w 23,805 18,776 42,581 353 32.9 
14w 24,772 16,536 41,308 340 34.4 
15w 25,882 17,053 42,935 323 35.3 
16w 22,626 15,634 38,260 311 34.7 
14 (.05) 29,015 19,809 48,824 252 38.1 
14 (.10) 27,663 18,150 45,813 231 39.0 
15w (. 05) 25,481 15,854 41,335 292 37.0 
15w (.10) 24,131 14,786 38,917 265 38.1 
aLength is in days. W denotes a linearly weighted moving average. 
The number in parentheses is the minimum penetration required. 
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TABLE VIII 
NET PROFITS IN DOLLARS FROM THE FEEDER CATTLE FUTURES MARKET 
USING A COMBINATION OF TWO MOVING AVERAGES, 1972-1977 
Lengths of Net Profits Net Ptofits Total Total Percent 
Moving from from Net Number Profitable 
a Long Trades Short Trades ·Profits of Trades Trades Averages 
3-10 24,536 17,864 42,400 268 40.3 
4-10 24,555 19,827 44,382 256 43.4 
5-10 24,635 19,646 44,281 256 51.4 
6-10 23,672 18,473 42,145 271 41.3 
3-9 23,855 18,918 42,773 287 40.1 
4-9 25,568 22,196 47,764 280 42.5 
5-9 25,534 22,310 41,844 279 41.6 
6-9 20,127 16,906 37,033 311 41.2 
3-8 24,883 19,485 44,368 306 38.6 
4-8 28,402 23,927 42,329 300 42.0 
5-8 24,232 20,471 44,703 325 38.0 
3-7 25,179 17,358 42,537 337 37.7 
4-7 27,689 19,742 47,431 349 38.4 
5-7 20,458 13,615 34,073 397 37.8 
a Length is in days. 
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also increased relative to the single moving averages. 
In Table VIII, the combinations of moving averages were grouped 
according to each of the longer length moving averages from 10 days 
down to 7 days. It should be noted that the 4-day lead moving average 
produced the highest percentage of profitable trades in each group. 
Total net profits were also the highest with the 4-day lead moving 
average except in the case of the 9-day group where the 5 and 9-day 
moving average combination was better by only $80. The 4 and 8-day 
combination was the most profitable one in Table VIII. 2 Its total net 
profits were nearly $6,000 greater than the 5-9 combination, the second 
most profitable combination. The performance of the 3-10 combination 
which is reported by commodity wire services could be classified as 
below average or average at best when compared with the other combina-
tions in Table VIII. 
The more promising combinations of two moving averages were also 
tested with a linear weighting technique which weighted the most 
recent prices the heaviest. With a 4-day lead moving average, weighting 
the longer moving average was always superior on the basis of total net 
profits.to weighting the 4-day average (Table IX). However, for the 
5-9, 5-10, and 3-10 combinations, weighting the shorter moving average 
was superior to weighting the longer moving average. Weighting the 
shorter moving average always reduced the total number of trades while 
weighting the longer moving average always increased the number of 
trades when compared with the same non-weighted combinations in Table 
VIII. No other ~eneralizations were apparent. 
2Notice that eight is a multiple of four. This could indicate 
that a simple harmonic relationship is involved. 
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TABLE IX 
NET PROFITS IN DOLLARS FROM THE FEEDER CATTLE FUTURES MARKET 
USING A COMBINATION OF TWO MOVING AVERAGES WITH 
LINEAR WEIGHTS, 1972-1977 
Lengths of Net Profits Net Profits Total Total Percent 
Moving from from Net Number Profitable 
a Long Trades Short Trades Profits of Trades Trades Averages 
4-7w 28,974 19,921 48,895 483 46.6 
4-8w 32,267 23,792 56,059 373 44.0 
4-9w 28,026 23,098 51,124 332 42.8 
4w-7 24,688 17,565 42,253 320 38.1 
4w-8 25,321 21,107 46,428 288 41.0 
4w-9 26,154 23,030 49,184 269 40.1 
3-8w 23,160 18,515 41,675 367 37.3 
4w-8w 24,570 19,415 43,985 313 39.3 
4-Bw 5,698 177 5,875 546 43.6 
5-9w 19,240 15,160 34,400 374 42.2 
Sw-9 25,456 21,690 47,146 268 39.9 
5-lOw 22,344 17,025 39,369 313 41.9 
Sw-10 26,723 20,853 47,576 240 43.3 
3-lOw 24,346 17,217 41,563 305 38.4 
3w-10 26,824 21,366 48,190 262 40.1 
a is in days. W denotes a linearly weighted moving Length average. 
The 4-day and 8-day weighted combination was clearly the most 
profitable (Table IX). The next most profitable combination, the 
4-9w combination, had almost $5,000 less total net profits . 
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. Purcell (1977) found that including a reactive third moving 
average as a lead price trend indicator reduced some of the false 
signals and increased total net profits in the live cattle futures 
market. Combinations of this type are reported in Table X. The 4-9-18 
day combination used by one chart service for all their commodities 
performed rather poorly over this six year simulation period for 
feeder cattle. The 4w-5-15 and 4w-5-10 combinations used by Purcell 
(1977, 1978) for live cattle and feeder cattle respectively were 
clearly superior to the 4-9-18 combination on the basis of total net 
prof its. 
Adding a shorter length moving average to the 5-10, 4-8, and 4-8w 
combinations decreased the total number of trades significantly, 
but increased the percent of profitable trades only slightly (Table X). 
As a result, the only three moving average combination having greater 
total net profits than its two moving average counterpart was the 
3-4-Bw combination. 
A penetration rule was also tested to determine its effectiveness 
in reducing false signals and increasing total net profits. Specifying 
a minimum penetration always reduced the total numbers of trades but 
usually resulted in only small increases in the percentage of profitable 
trades (Table XI). Increases in profits were not always substantial 
either. In fact, total net profits were decreased significantly when 
only a $. 01 per cwt. minimum penetration was specified for the 3-4-8w 
combination (Table X). Only a small increase in total net profits was 
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TABLE X 
NET PROFITS IN DOLLARS FROM THE FEEDER CATTLE FUTURES MARKET. 
USING A COMBINATION OF THREE MOVING AVERAGES, 1972-1977 
Lengths of Net Profits Net Profits Total Total Percent 
Moving from from Net Number Profitable 
a Long Trades Short Trades Trades of Trades Trades Averages 
4-9-18 17,615 6,012 23,627 132 45.5 
4w-5-15 24,579 12,369 36,948 160 50.6 
4w-5-10 23,038 18,279 41,316 202 43.1 
4-5-10 23,443 16,639 40,082 216 43.1 
3-5-10 22,635 16,180 28,815 208 44.2 
2-4-8 24,817 21,088 45,905 241 44.0 
3-4-8 28,175 23,380 51,555 253 43.1 
3w-4-8 26,404 22,499 48,903 238 44.5 
4w-4-9 26,496 22,767 49,263 235 45.1 
2-4-8w 25,156 18,730 43,886 234 43.6 
3-4-82 32,019 25,334 47,353 260 -44.6 
3w-4-8w 28,263 22,460 50' 723 233 45.1 
4w-4-8w 28,217 22,589 50,806 230 45.7 
3-4-8w (. 01) 30,275 22,712 52,987 254 44.9 
a Length is in days. W denotes a linearly weighted moving average. 
The number in parentheses is the minimum penetration required in $/cwt. 
Lenghts of 
Moving 
a Averages 
3-10 
3-10 
3-10 
4w-5-10 
4w-5-10 
4w-5-10 
4-8 
4_;8 
4-8 
4-8w 
4-8w 
4-8w 
a Length 
TABLE XI 
NET PROFITS IN DOLLARS FROM THE FEEDER CATTLE FUTURES MARKET USING 
SELECTED MOVING AVERAGES WITH A PENETRATION RULE, 1972-1977 
Minimum Net Profits Net Profits Total Total 
Penetration from from Net Number 
Required Long Trades Short Trades Profits of Trades 
. 03 25,427 18,814 44,241 249 
.04 25,650 18,700 44,350 248 
.05 25,266 19,060 44~·326 241 
.01 24,011 18,622 42,633 198 
• 02 23,994 18,717 42 '711 193 
.03 23,710 18,434 42,144 183 
.04 29,614 24,286 63,900 268 
• 05 - 29,845 24,517 54,362 268 
.06 28,440 23,217 51,657 256 
. 04 32,087 24,761 56,848 288 
.05 33,828 26,405 "60,233 276 
.06 32,820 25,291 58,111 254 
is in days. W denotes a linearly weighted moving average. 
Percent 
Profitable 
Trades 
43.0 
42.7 
42.7 
43.4 
44.0 
45.4 
42.2 
42.5 
41.8 
44.1 
44.6 
45.3 
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obtained when a $.02 per cwt. penetration rule was used with the 4w-5-10 
combination (Table XI). It appears that a penetration rule has rather 
limited usefulness when working with combinations of three moving 
averages. 
The 4-Bw combination was definitely helped the most by the 
penetration rule from the standpoint of both profits and number of 
trades. The $.05 per cwt. minimum penetration increased total net 
profits by over $4,000 and reduced the total number of trades by 23 
percent from 373 to 276 (Table XI). This evidence seems to indicate 
that a penetration rule improves the performance most of, the more reac-
tive or sensitive combinations which tend to generate a rather large 
number of trades, e.g. combinations using a linear weighting scheme on 
the longer moving average. 
W1tile the purpose of a penetration rule is to increase total' net 
profits by reducing the number of false signals, profits can also be 
increased by reducing the dollar loss of the unprofitable trades. 
An ordinary stop based on the entry price of a trade and a trailing 
stop based on the previous day's closing price were tested in an at-
tempt to keep losses small on the losing trades. However, both of 
these stop ioss techniques caused an increase in the total number of 
trades, increased the number of whipsaw losses, and thus substantially 
reduced the total net profits. Due to the lack of promising results, 
further refinements. of stop loss rules were not examined·. 
It is important to point out,that most of the profits generated 
from the moving average trading schemes were not confined to,a single, 
unusual year. Table XII presents the yearly distribution of profits 
from various moving average combinations. Yearly profits were above 
---------------
TABLE XII 
YEARLY DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS IN DOLLARS FROM SELECTED 
COMBINATIONS OF MOVING AVERAGES, 1972-1977 
Combination a 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
4-8w (.OS) 3,150 10,865 14,497 8,037 13' 249 10,435 
14 3,036 12,786 11,730 5,346 13,772. -911 
3-10 3,242 9,041 7,689 4,583 14,644 3,201 
4w-5-10 1,132 10,596 5,645 8,608 11,128 4,207 
a W denotes a linearly weighted moving average. The number 
parentheses is the minimum penetration required. 
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Average 
10,039 
7,627 
7,067 
6,886 
in 
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average in at least three of the years for each combination. The 
profits from the 4-Sw combination with a $.05 minimum penetration rule 
were distributed extremely well. 
Summary 
The 4-day and 8-day linearly weighted moving average combination 
with a $.05 minimum penetration rule had considerably greater total 
net profits than any other tested moving average combination. However, 
there were many combinations which had substantially higher profits 
than the conventional 3 and 10-day combination. 
When used separately, both the penetration rule and the addition 
of a shorter length third moving average increased total net profits 
of combinations which were more reactive to price changes. Increases 
in profits were considerably smaller with the less reactive moving 
average combinations. Improvements of any kind were not obtained 
from the use of either an ordinary stop or a trailing stop. 
The results from this optimization process definitely indicate 
the potential usefulness of moving averages in the development of a 
selective hedging strategy for feeder cattle. It seems apparent that 
moving averages should be quite helpful in determining the proper time 
to place and lift the hedge for a feeder cattle hedger whose primary 
goal is a more favorable price. The results of short and long hedging 
strategy simulations based on both point and figure charts and moving 
averages will be presented in the next two chapters. 
CHAPTER V 
TESTING ALTERNATIVE SHORT HEDGING STRATEGIES 
FOR FEEDER CATTLE 
As mentioned in the first chapter, indications in 1978 point to 
higher _feeder cattle prices for the next several years. However, upward 
trending feeder cattle prices will not eliminate the high level of risk 
faced by the feeder cattle producer. Higher feeder cattle prices will 
also mean higher prices for stocker calves which will substantially 
increase operating expenses. Furthermore, it is not likely that feeder 
cattle prices will be as stable as in the period from the mid-1960's 
through 1971. Seasonal supply and demand for feeder cattle coupled 
with variable weather conditions, fluctuating grain prices, and other 
factors can result in sizeable short run price declines. Therefore, 
even upward moving feeder cattle prices do not guarantee that profits 
will always be made from producing feeder cattle. 
When feeder cattle prices become relatively high, many feeder 
cattle producers feel that any marketing strategy will reap large 
profits. Past evidence clearly shows that this is not always the case. 
Many producers received over $50 per cwt. for their feeder cattle in 
the spring and early summer of 1973. With a very optimistic attitude, 
many of these producers paid in excess of $70 per cwt. for stocker 
calves that fall only to receive $35 or less per cwt. for their. feeder 
cattle in the spring of 1974. Needless to say, losses were huge. If 
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there is nothing else positive from this experience, it did teach the 
feeder cattle producer that he must become more concerned about his 
marketing strategy. 
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The feeder cattle futures market is one avenue open to the feeder 
cattle producer in developing a marketing strategy. A feeder cattle 
futures contract is guaranteed by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
clearing house, so it is safer than a cash forward contract which has 
no such guarantee in case the other party reneges. A futures contract 
is also more flexible than a cash forward contract. After being pur-
chased, the futures contract may be liquidated at any time through an 
offsetting transaction. This feature allows the holder of a futures 
contract to cancel his committment to avoid potential losses from ad-
verse futures market price movements. Once a cash forward contract 
is signed, the committment cannot be offset or eliminated. 
The producer is liable in case of unexpected death losses with a 
cash forward contract since delivery is mandatory. The holder of a 
futures contract never needs to worry about default because delivery 
is not mandatory; the futures contract can simply be liquidated. These 
characteristics plus the accessibility of the feeder cattle futures 
market make it one of the most useful marketing tools available to 
feeder ca~tle producers. 
No other marekting device has as much potential as the feeder 
cattle futures market in helping the producer obtain a more favorable 
price. An effective selective hedging strategy can substantially in-
crease the profits of a feeder cattle operation. The problem is 
developing such a strategy which will protect against price declines 
without forfeiting the profits of an upward moving market. 
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In this chapter, the knowledge and results from the optimization 
of the point and figure chart and moving average parameters will be 
applied and combined with various production situations to determine 
the usefulness of selective hedging strategies based on these technical 
tools. The method of analysis, production alternatives, and results 
of the various hedging strategies will all be covered in this chapter. 
Method of Analysis 
Three basic production situations representative of Northcentral 
and Northwestern Oklahoma were simulated to test the alternative 
hedging strategies. The costs and revenues using actual cash prices 
were simulated over a six-year period beginning in November, 197~ and 
ending in October, 1977,for each of the three production alternatives. 
A total of eight hedging strategies were tested with each production 
alternative. The stream of net returns from the production activities 
was combined with the futures mark~t profits from each of the hedging 
strategies to arrive at a combined average return and standard devia-
tion figure for each alternative. 
The following costs were used for the production simulations: 
1. A 400 to 500 pound choice stocker steer at Oklahoma City 
at the average weekly price for these calves. 
2. Operating inputs including hay, protein supplement, starter 
feed, salt, vet and medicine, trucking, sales commission, and other 
miscellaneous expenses, plus labor costs and the ownership costs of 
machinery and equipment. The amounts and prices for these items were 
taken directly from enterprise budgets prepared by the Area Farm Man-
agement Extension Specialists in Northcentral and Northwestern Oklahoma. 
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3. Interest on the operating costs in (1) and (2) at the interest 
rates indicated in the enterprise budgets. 
4. Commission and irtterest on the initial margin requirement for 
a feeder cattle futures contract. A commission charge of $50 per trade 
was subtracted from the returns. An $800 initial margin requirement was 
used. The same interest rates used in (3) were also used to calculate 
the interest charges on the margin requirement. 
No charges were assessed for grazing in these simulations. All 
operating expenses were adjusted upward to reflect a 2 percent death 
loss. 
The income came from the sale of the feeder steers at the end of 
the production period. This revenue was computed from the average 
weekly price of choice feeder steers in Oklahoma City for the appropri-
ate weight class during the week the steers were sold. The number of 
steers produced in each production situation was varied so that the 
total final weight of the feeder steers would be 42,000 pounds, the size 
of one feeder cattle futures contract. 
Production Alternatives 
The first production alternative simulated the situation where 
stocker calves are bought in the fall and grazed on small grains pasture 
only until the middle of Harch. This simulation corresponds with a 
' farmer planning to harvest the grain. Seventy-four 400 pound stocker 
steers are purchased during the week of November 15 and sold at a weight 
of 565 pounds during the week of March 15 for an average daily gain of 
1.35 pounds. The March feeder cattle contract is used for hedging. 
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This procedure is repeated for each of the six years. All three produc-
tion alternatives will have six observations. 
With the second production alternative, the feeder steers are 
allowed to graze-out the small grains pasture. Sixty-two stockers 
weighing 400 pounds are bought during the week of November 15 and sold 
during the week of May 15 weighing 678 pounds. Average daily gains 
are assumed to be 1. 35 pounds from November 15 to March 15 and 1. 85 
pounds from March 15 to May 15. The May contract is used for hedging 
the feeder steers. 
The final production alternative is a summer stocker simulation • 
.. 
Sixty-one 500 pound stocker steer calves are purchased on May 1 and are 
sold on October 1 weighing 690 pounds. An average daily gain of 1.25 
pounds is assumed during this five-month period. The October contract 
is used for hedging. 
Criteria Used to Compare Hedging Strategies 
The average net return and standard deviation of net returns in 
dollars per head are calculated for each of the alternative production 
and hedging strategy combinations. The average net return is a measure 
of the profitability of each hedging strategy. The standard deviation 
is a measure of the variability of the six net returns. It serves as 
a comparison of risk among the various hedging strategies. It is a 
relative measure and not an absolute measure of risk. 
The coefficient of variation is another measure used .to compare 
the strategies. It is the standard deviation expressed as a percentage 
of the average return. It also measures the variability of the six 
net returns but is adjusted for the size of the average return. For 
example, if two average returns of $10 and $50 per head both have a 
standard deviation of $5, the coefficient of variation for the $10 
average return will be 50 percent but only 10 percent for the $50 
average return. 
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Three absolute measures were reported to aid comparison among the 
various hedging strategies. These measures were the low return, the 
high return, and the total number of trades or hedges placed during the 
six production periods. 
Hedging Strategies 
The same trading rules and sell and buy signals used in the 
optimization procedures were used to place and lift, respectively, the 
short hedges. The hedges could be placed during the production period 
only. Since the expected production was equal to 42,000 pounds for 
each of the production situations, the size of the open position was 
limited to one feeder cattle futures contract. 
Strategy 1 
No hedging was done with this strategy. Its results correspond 
to the production activity only. It serves as a benchmark to compare 
the effectiveness of the other strategies. The net returns from the 
other alternatives are obtained by adding the net returns from Strategy 
1 to the futures profits resulting from the alternative hedging 
strategies. 
Strategy 2 
Strategy 2 is a nonselective hedging strategy. A hedge is placed 
at the beginning of the production process and lifted when the feeder 
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steers are sold. This strategy will increase profits only if the 
futures price at the beginning of the production period is greater than 
at the end of the production period. However, this strategy should con-
siderably reduce the variability of the flow of net returns. Losses in 
the futures market should be offset by higher cash prices. Likewise, 
profits should be made in the futures market if the cash price for 
feeder steers declines. 
Strategy 3 
This is a selective hedging strategy based on the 3 and 10-day 
moving averages. The crossing action of the moving averages determines 
when to place and lift the hedge. The hedge is placed whenever the 
shorter 3-day moving average crosses the longer 10-day moving average 
from above. The_h~dge is lifted whenever the 3-day moving average 
crosses the 10-day moving average from below. Therefore, the hedge 
can be placed and lifted several times during the production period. 
Theoretically, a selective hedging strateg_y should protect the 
feeder cattle producer from a,price decline and also allow the benefits 
of upward m6ving cash prices. The 3 and 10-day combination was 
selected for testing since it is reported by the commodity news wire. 
Strategy 4 
This selective hedging strategy is similar to Strategy 3 excE\pt 
that the 4-day linearly weighted, 5-day, and 10-day moving average 
combination is used instead of the 3-10 combination. The 4w-5-10 com-
bination was selected for testing since it was the most profitable one 
reported by Purcell (1978) for hedging feeder cattle. 
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Strategy 5 
The 4-day and 8-day linearly weighted moving averages with a $.05 
per cwt. minimum penetration rule are used to place and lift hedges with 
this strategy. This moving average combination produced the highest 
net profits from the short trades in the optimization procedure pre-
sented in Chapter IV. 
Strategy 6 
Strategy 6 uses the point and figure charting method of technical 
price analysis to hedge selectively. Breakouts of the double bottom 
and top formations are used to place and lift the hedges, respectively. 
This particular strategy is based on the commonly used $.20 box size 
and three box reversal. 
Strategy 7 
A $.40 box size and a one box reversal point and figure chart with 
a $1.45 trailing stop is used for Strategy 7. The $. 40 x 1 parameter 
combination is used by one chart service for live cattle. The $1.45 
trailing stop was included since it increased net profits from the 
short trades more than any o'ther stop or trailing stop tested with the 
$.40 x 1 combination in the optimization study. 
Strategy 8 
Strategy 8 is based on a $.05 x 5 point and figure chart with a 
$1.50 trailing stop. This parameter combination had the highest 
' 
net profits from the short trades of any combination tested in the op-
timization process in Chapter III. 
Compari$on of the Alternative 
Hedging Strategies 
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Tables XIII, XIV, and XV present the summary statistics for the 
eight alternative hedging strategies for each of the three simulated 
production alternatives. Changes in the average return per head and 
the standard deviation of returns relative to the "no hedge" strategy, 
Strategy 1, are also shown in the tables. 
The Small Grains Grazing Production 
Alternative (Table XIII) 
Strategies 7 and 8 more than doubled the average return per head 
over the "no hedge" strategy. All six of the selective hedging strate-
gies, Strategies 3 through 8, substantially increased average returns 
and greatly reduced the variability of returns _(as shown by the change 
in the standard deviation) when compared to Strategy 1. As expected, 
the "hedge and hold" strategy had the lowest standard deviation, but 
it also significantly reduced the average return per head. 
The low returns were greatly increased with any of the hedging 
strategies. Strategies 5 and 8 even had positive low returns. The 
high return for the six production periods was decreased by all the 
hedging strategies, but only slightly with the point and figure chart 
strategies. 
As a group, the point and figure chart strategies did a better 
job of increasing average returns than the moving average strategies. 
However, the moving averages were superior to the point and figure 
charts on the basis of decreasing variability. Using the coefficient 
of variation for comparison, there was little difference between the 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
TABLE XIII 
RESULTS OF SIMULATED SHORT HEDGING STRATEGIES FOR THE SMALL GRAINS GRAZING 
PRODUCTION ALTERNATIVE IN DOLLARS PER HEAD, 1972-1977 
Change in Standard Change 
Returns Deviation· in Standard Coefficient 
Average from of Deviation from of Low High 
Strategy Return Strategy 1 Return Strategy 1 Variation Return Return 
No Hedge 13.20 50.13 379.9% -69.03 85.04 
Hedge & Hold 4.67 -8.53 13.92 -36.21 298.5% -16.15 24.28 
3-10 21.64 +8.44 20.76 -29.37 95.9% -1.80 48.75 
4w-5-10 22.04 -8.84 23.70 -26.43 107.5% -0.19 60.71 
4-8w ($.05) 21.67 +8.47 16.63 -33.50 76.7% 2.16 43.54 
.20x3 23.75 +10.55 28.80 -21.33 121.3% -1.02 78.41 
.40xl ($1.45T) 29.06 +15.86 27.93 -22.20 96.1% -1.98 78.12 
.OSxS ($1. SOT) 30.97 +17. 77 22.71 -27.42 73.3% 16.00 76.03 
Number 
of 
Trades 
0 
6 
23 
18 
23 
14 
15 
22 
-...I 
N 
moving averages and the point and figure charts. 
The Small Grains Graze-Out Production 
Alternative (Table XIV) 
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The selective hedging strategies increased average returns from 
$14 to $21 per head over Strategy 1. These increases in returns were 
also accompanied by sizeable decreases in the standard deviations. 
Again the "hedge and hold" strategy reduced the variability of returns 
the most but also caused a reduction in the average return per head. 
All the strategies except Strategy 1 had positive low returns. 
The high returns fqr the selective strategies were greater than the 
high return of the "no hedge" strategy. There were no distinct differ-
ences between the results of the point and figure chart and moving 
average strategies. One peculiar result was that the "non-optimal" 
$.20 x 3 point and figure chart strategy had a higher average return 
than either of the other two point and figure chart strategies, 
Strategies 7 and 8. 
The Summer Stocker Production 
Alternative (Table XV) 
This pro,duction alternative was helped the most of the three by 
the hedging strategies, both in an absolute and relative sense when 
compared with the "no hedge" strategy. Even the "hedge and hold" strate-
gy significantly increased the average return per head. This result is 
not that unusual when one considers the fact that feeder cattle prices 
are typically at seasonal highs in the spring and at seasonal lows in 
the fall. 
Strategy 
1. No Hedge 
2. Hedge & Hold 
3. 3-10 
4. 4w-5-10 
5. 4-8w ($.05) 
6. .20x3 
7. .40xl ($1. 45T) 
8. .05x5 ($1. SOT) 
TABLE XIV 
RESULTS OF SIMULATED SHORT HEDGING STRATEGIES FOR THE SMALL GRAINS GRAZE-
OUT PRODUCTION ALTERNATIVE IN DOLLARS PER HEAD, 1972-1977 
Change in Standard Change 
Returns Deviation in Standard Coefficient 
-
Average from of Deviation from of Low High 
Return Strategy 1 Return Strategy 1 Variation Return Return 
49.10 50.80 103.5% -46.48 103.34 
34.62 -14.48 10.08 -40.72 29.1% 21.73 49.76 
67.87 +18.88 32.39 -18.51 47.6% 27.84 108.69 
67.02 +17.92 37.45 -13.35 55.9% 22.61 118.84 
70.54 +21.44 35.64 -15.16 50.5% 28.11 117.30 
69.95 +20.85 36.15 -14.65 51.7% 34.94 134.54 
63.55 +14.45 29.46 -21.34 46.4% 29.59 106.04 
66.08 +16.98 35.38 -15.42 53.5% 19.85 121.41 
Number 
of 
Trades 
0 
6 
34 
26 
34 
18 
22 
29 
Strategy 
1. No Hedge 
2o Hedge & Hold 
3o 3-10 
4o 4w-5-10 
5o 4-8w ($o05) 
6o o20x3 
7o o40x1 ($1.45T) 
8o o05x5 ($1o50T) 
TABLE XV 
RESL"LTS OF SIN:ULATED SHORT HEDGING STRATEGIES FOR THE SUMMER STOCKER 
PRODUCTION ALTERNATIVE IN DOLLARS PER HEAD, 1972-1977 
Change in Standard Change 
Returns Deviation in Standard Coefficient 
Average from of Deviation from of Low 
Return Strategy 1 Return Strategy 1 Variation Return 
1. 90 53 0 05 2792o2% -72 0 73 
17o78 +15o88 17o47 -35o58 98o3% -2o85 
22o89 +20o99 36o08 -16o97 157o7% -14o63 
21.43 +l9o53 36o25 -16o80 169o2% -17o94 
31.29 +Z9o39 29o76 -23o29 95o1% -8o22 
23o97 +22o07 24o82 -28o23 103o6% 3o20 
27o08 +25o18 27 0 72 -25o33 102o3% -l4o90 
26o 72 +24,82 30o69 -22o36 l14o9% -l2o69 
Number 
High of 
Return Trades 
60o 72 0 
35o69 6 
76~86 31 
84o01 23 
79~69 34 
68o73 19 
70o10 23 
58.35 33 
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Strategy 5, the 4-8w moving average combination with a $.05 minimum 
penetration rule, gave the largest average return per head and the 
lowest coefficient of variation although Strategy 6 had the lowest stan-
dard deviation of the selective strategies. As a group, the point and 
figure chart strategies resulted in less variable returns and lower 
coefficients of variation than the moving averages. 
Strategy 6 was the only one having a positive low return, but the 
low returns of all the strategies involving hedging were substantially 
improved over the low return of -$72.73 for Strategy 1. 
Summary 
In every case, the selective hedging strategies increased the 
average returns per head and reduced the variability of returns when 
compared with the "no hedge" strategy. Any of the selective hedging 
strategies was a definite improvement over the "no hedge" strategy 
on the basis of these criteria. However, selection of the "best" 
hedging strategy must be left up to each individual hedger and will 
depend upon his own trade-off between expected returns and risk. 
A producer whose goal is to maximize profits would want to select the 
strategy most likely to result in the highest average returns. On the 
other hand, a producer whose primary concern is to reduce risk might 
opt for a strategy giving a lower average return in order to reduce 
the variability or standard deviation of returns. A producer concerned 
about his cash flow position might want to select the strategy most 
likely to result in a positive return year after year. 
The results of this production and hedging simulation definitely 
indicate hedging can be an effective management and marketing tool to 
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simultaneously increase profits and reduce risk. A necessary require-
ment for successful selective hedging is a thorough understanding of 
the futures markets plus the willingness to stick with the particular 
hedging strategy chosen. A feeder cattle producer willing to spend 
the time necessary for a successful hedging program should reap substan-
tial benefits for his efforts. 
CHAPTER VI 
TESTING ALTERNATIVE LONG HEDGING 
STRATEGIES FOR FEEDER CATTLE 
Rising feeder cattle prices can create both problems and opportun-
ity for the cattle feeder. Higher feeder cattle prices increase oper-
ating costs and also increase the risk of financial loss. However, 
effective use of the long hedge for feeder cattle can substantially 
improve the profitability of a cattle feeding operation. 
Many cattle feeders have discovered the usefulness of a short 
live cattle hedge during times of downward moving cattle prices which 
have occurred since late 1973. However, as the liquidation phase of 
the cattle cycle is completed and expansion is begun, all cattle prices 
will tend to be trending upward. Desired results from the short live 
cattle hedge will be more difficult to achieve. As mentioned in the 
first chapter, the long hedge for feeder cattle may do more to increase 
profits and reduce risk for the cattle feeder than the short live 
cattle hedge during the next several years. 
In this chapter, various_long hedging strategies will be tested to 
determine their potential ability to take advantage of upward trending 
prices. The procedure, the strategies, and the results will all be 
discussed and examined in the remainder of the chapter. 
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Method of Analysis 
Since the year-round cattle feeder continuously needs feeder 
cattle, he has a "short" cash position and needs to buy or take a 
"long" position in the feeder cattle futures market to hedge against 
rising cash prices. Therefore, only long positions were taken in this 
hedging simulation. Two lengths of planning horizons, a 90-day and a 
180-day period, were arbitrarily selected for this analysis. A cattle 
feeder may want to choose the length of time of the feeding period 
for his planning horizon. There is no hard and fast rule concerning 
this decision. 
The simulation began on January 1, 1972, and ended on November 14, 
1977. A new planning period was started each week. The size of the 
open position for each period was limited to only one contract, assumed 
to consist of 65 head of feeder steers weighing approximately 646. 
pounds. In the earlier years of this simulation, not all the contracts 
began trading early enough to allow a complete 180-day planning period. 
When this situation occurred, the hedging strategies were started as 
soon as the contract began trading. 
The March, April, May, August, September, October, and November 
contracts were used for hedging. The newly created January contract 
was not used in this study. The month of the ending date of the plan-
ning period determined which contract was used. When the ending date 
fell past the fourteenth of a delivery month, the next contract was 
used for hedging to avoid taking delivery. Because of the gap between 
the May and August and the November and March contracts, the August 
and March contracts were used to place hedges in a proportionately 
large number of periods. 
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The same trading rules and signals described in Chapters III and IV 
were fol.lowed to place and lift the long hedges, except th~t the long 
trades could be initiated after the first of the delivery month and 
held until the end of the planning period. An arbitrarily ehosen com-
mission fee of $50 per round turn was charged against the futures 
market profits. A $600 initial margin requirement and a $400 mainte-
nance margin requfrement were arbitrarily selected for the simulation 
period. A margin call was issued anytime the margin money fell below 
$400 per contract, and enough money was added to the hedging account 
to replenish the margin money back to $600 per contract. Interest on 
the margin money was charged at a rate equal to the·average annual 
prime rate charged by banks as reported in the Business Conditions 
Digest (U. S. Department of Connnerce, 1977) plus 2 percent. 
The per head ne,t profits from the futures market ·were subtracted 
from the cost of a 646 pound feeder. steer using the appropriate average 
weekly cash price for choice 600 to 700 pound feeder steers at Oklahoma 
City. The average cost per head for each strategy and the standard 
deviation were calculated to compare the effectiveness of the different 
strategies in reducing the cost and the variability over the six-year 
period. The coefficient of variation, a measure of the variability 
based on the size of the average cost, was also computed for each 
strategy. However, it should be analyzed in conjunction with the aver-
age cost and standard deviation since in this case, a less desireable 
higher average cost will reduce the .size of the coefficient of variation 
given the same standard deviation. The highest and lowest costs for 
feeder steers that occurred during the simulation period were also re-
ported for each strategy. 
The best and worst dollar positions in the futures market were 
recorded for both a single contract and multiple contracts held con-
currently at any one point in time. The largest quarterly loss and 
profit in the futures market, based on the dates the trades were 
completed and not the ending dates of the planning periods, were also 
computed for each strategy and serve as a proxy measure of the varia-
bility and distribution of the profits in the futures market. 
Hedging Strategies 
A "no hedge" strategy, a nonselective hedging strategy, and six 
selective hedging strategies based on moving averages and point and 
figure charts were tested with both the 90-day and 180-day planning 
periods. 
Strategy 1 
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This is the "no hedge" strategy. It corresponds to the situation 
of simply buying the feeder cattle at the end of the planning periods. 
Its average cost is that of a 646 pound choice feeder steer at Oklahoma 
City over the six-year period. This cash cost is used in the other 
strategies involving hedging strategies and serves as the basis of cod-
parison among the alternative strategies. 
Strategy 2 
Strategy 2 is a nonselective hedging strategy. A long hedge is 
placed at the beginning of the planning period and. lifted at the end of 
each period. It will decrease the cost of feeder steers only if the 
futures price at the beginning is lower than at the ending date of the 
period. 
Strategy 3 
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This is a selective hedging strategy based on the 3 and 10-day 
moving averages. The crossing action of the moving averages determines 
when to place and lift the hedge. As a result, many hedges may be 
placed and lifted during the planning period. This moving average com-
bination has been selected for testing since it is reported by the com-
modity news wire service. 
Strategy 4 
This strategy is similar to Strategy 3 except the 4-day weighted, 
5-day, and 10-day moving average combination is used rather than the 
3-10 combination. The 4w-5-10 combination was the most profitable 
moving average combination tested by Purcell (1978) in a long hedging 
simulation for feeder cattle. 
Strategy 5 
Strategy 5 used the optimized moving average combinatioil.reported 
in Chapter IV, the 4-day and 8-day weighted combination with a $.05 per 
cwt. minimum penetration rule. 
Strategy 6 
The last three strategies are based on the buy and sell signals 
generated from the double top and bottom formations of point and figure 
charts. This particular strategy uses the common $.20 box size and 
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three box reversal. 
Strtttegy 7 
Strategy 7 uses a $.40 box size and a one box reversal parameter 
combination. These parameters are used by one chart service for their 
live cattle point and figure chart. A $1.45 trailing stop was also 
incorporated into this strategy since it increased profits from the 
long trades the most in the optimization study using the $.40 x 1 
combination. 
Strategy 8 
This strategy is based on a $.15 x 1 point and figure chart and a 
$.25 ordinary stop. This particular combination had the greatest 
profits from the long trades of any combination tested in Chapter III. 
Comparison of the Alternative 
Hedging Strategies 
The 90-day Planning Period (Tables XVI and XVII) 
Table XVI presents the summary statistics of the futures market 
results of the various strategies. All the selective strategies con-
tributed from $8 to over $10 per head to the feeding profits. The 
"hedge and hold" strategy resulted in a negative $1.87 futures profit 
per head. The amount of interest on the margin ~oney for this strategy 
was nearly double that for any of the selective strategies. 
The number of trades appears to be large for the selective 
strategies because of the overlap of the 294 planning periods. Using 
a 90-day planning period and starting a new period each week means 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Strategy 
No Hedge 
Hedge & Hold 
3 - 10 
4w-5--10 
4-8w (.05) 
$.20 X 3 
$.40xl ($1.45T) 
$.15xl ($. 25) 
TABLE XVI 
SUMMARY OF THE FUTURES MARKET RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVE LONG HEDGING STRATEGIES 
USING A 90-DAY PLANNING PERIOD, 1972-1977 
Mo. Interest Met Per Head Worst Single Best-Single Worst Multiple Best Multiple 
of on Margin Profit Net Contract Contract Contract Contract Trades Money From Trade~ Profit Position Position Position Position 
0 
294 $10,327 $ -35,671 $ -1.87 ~ -7,686 $ 7,362 $ -58,724 $67.741 
957 5,343 153,155 8.02 '-3, 906 7,224 
-20,214 67,981 
709 5,281 169,549 8.88 -3,906 7,131 
-18,387 67,510 
1,010 5,038 189,210 9.90 -3,906 7,236 
-20,214 68,035 
632 5,768 141,179 7.39 -2,184 7,014 
-15,161 67,905 
698 5,308 193.306 10.12 -2,225 7,014 
- 8,000 67,821 
1,123 5,152 207,292 10.85 
-
840 7,329 
- 6,005 67.758 
-----
aAllovs for charges for interest on margin money and-a commission of $50 per trade. 
Largest Largest 
Quarterly Quarterly 
Loss Profit 
$ -58,744 $45,898 
-14,623 37.208 
- 8,895 58,367 
-10,662 36,493 
-22,281 55,539 
-12,305 49,209 
-11,689 44,045 
Strategy 
1. No Hedge 
2. Hedge & Hold 
3. 3 - 10 
4. 4w-5-10 
5. 4-8w (.OS) 
6. $.20x3 
7. $.40xl ($1. 45T) 
8. $.15xl ($.25) 
TABLE XVII 
RESULTS OF SIMULATED LONG HEDGING STRATEGIES USING A 90-DAY PLANNING 
PERIOD IN DOLLARS PER HEAD, 1972-1977 
Feeder Steer Change in Std. Dev. Change in Coefficient 
Average Avg. Cost from of Std. Dev. from of 
Cost Strategy 1 Avg. Cost Strategyl Variation 
260.25 49.67 19.1% 
262.12 +1.87 47.64 -2.03 18.2% 
252.23 -8.02 46.52 -3.15 18.4% 
251.37 -8.88 47.33 -2.34 18.8% 
250.35 -9.90 46.80 -2.87 18.7% 
252.86 -7.39 45.58 -4.09 18.0% 
250.13 -10.12 42.11 -7.56 16.8% 
249.40 -10.85 41.31 -8.36 16.6% 
High 
Cost 
422.58 
438.82 
434.93 
431.00 
434.93 
449.01 
383.82 
394.80 
Low 
Cost 
159.92 
162.51 
169.82 
164.33 
162.64 
167.81 
166.06 
168.39 
00 
\J1 
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that as many as 12 periods could be in various stages of completion at 
any point in time. 
The values of the best single and multiple contract positions were 
considerably greater than the absolute values of the worst positions 
for the selective hedging strategies. The worst positions for the 
point and figure chart strategies were more favorable than those asso-
ciated with the moving average strategies. However, as a group, the 
largest quarterly losses were smaller with the moving average strategies. 
All six of the selective hedging strategies had lower standard 
deviations than the "hedge and hold" strategy, a result not usually 
expected (Table XVII). Furthermore, Strategy 2 was the only one which 
failed to reduce the average cost. Based on these two criteria, 
Strategy 2 was clearly inferior to any of the selective hedging 
strategies. 
Only Strategies 7 and 8 had lower "high cost" figures than the 
"no hedge" strategy. None of the strategies were successful in 
reducing the low cost below that of Strategy 1. Strategies 5 and 8, 
which were based on the optimized parameter combinations, produced the 
lowest average costs. Strategy 8 reduced the average cost for feeder 
steers to $294.40 per head or $38.60 per cwt. The average cost was 
$250.35 per head or $38.74 per cwt. for a 646 pound feeder steer using 
Strategy 5. 
The 180-day Planning Period (Tables XVIII 
and XIX) 
All the selective hedging strategies based on technical pDice 
analysis performed very well with net futures profits ranging from 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
TABLE XVIII 
SUMMARY OF THE FUTURES MARKET RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVE LONG HEDGING STRATEGIES 
USING A 180-DAY PLANNING PERIOD, 1972-1977 
No. Interest on Per Head Worst Single Beat Single Worst Multiple Best Multiple Largest 
Strategy of Margin Net Profit Net Contract Contract Contract Contract Quarterly 
Trades Money Frc. Trades 8 Profit Position Position Position Position Loss 
No Hedge 0 
Hedge & Hold 281 $ 20,549 $ 44,945 $ 2.47 $ -8,315 $ 9,156 $ b $ 106,255 $ -62,490 
3 - 10 1,557 9,556 309,298 16.94 -2,927 7,320 -26,350 94,634 -19,083 
4w-5-10 1,146 10,439 306,719 16.80 -2,675 7,161 -26,249 92,945 -20,586 
4-811 (.05) 1;618 8,523 . 380,186 20.82 -2,927 7,236 -20,214 92,966 -24,610 
$.20x3 981 11,201 261,346 14.31 -2,184 7,497 -18,185 94,878 -36,952 
$.40:d ($1.45T) 1,119 10,792 320,675 17.56 -1,049 7,035 -13,439 91,350 -31,194 
$.15d ($.25) 1,792 10,920 368,088 20.15 
- 840 7,434 -13,439 93,597 -32,898 
8Allows for charges for interest on .argin money and a commission of $50 per trade. 
bLess than. -$100,000. 
Largest 
Quarterly 
Profit 
$ 52,135 
94,416 
117,245 
90,474 
112,235 
103,304 
102,463 
Strategy 
1. No Hedge 
2. Hedge & Hold 
3. 3 - 10 
4. 4w-5-10 
5. 4-8w (. 05) 
6. $. Ox3 
7. $.40x1 ($1. 45T) 
8. $.15x1 ($.25) 
TABLE XIX 
RESULTS OF SIMULATED LONG HEDGING STRATEGIES USING A 180-DAY PLANNING 
PERIOD IN DOLLARS PER HEAD, 1972-1977 
Feeder Steer Change in Std. Dev. Change in Coefficient 
Average Avg. Cost from of Std. Dev. from of 
Cost Strategy 1 Avg. Cost Strategy 1 Variation 
260.69 50.74 19.5% 
258.22 -2.4 7 40.58 -10.16 15.7% 
243.75 -16.94 40.18 -10.56 16.5% 
243.89 -16.80 41.63 -9.11 17.1% 
239.87 -20.82 40.38 -10.36 16.8% 
246.38 -14.31 40.69 -10.05 16.5% 
243.13 -17.56 3 7 .-2'9 -13.45 15.3% 
240.54 -20.15 34.90 -15.84 14.5%-
High Low 
Cost Cost 
422.58 159.92 
374.10 167.14 
360.14 173.81 
357.69 161.20 
357.29 167.12 
362.43 168.58 
357.78 165.35 
340.39 173.36 
01) 
01) 
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$14.31 to $20.82 per head. The "hedge and hold" strategy resulted in 
a positive $2.47 futures profit per head. As with the 90-day planning 
periods, interest charges for Strategy 2 were about twice as much com-
pared with any other hedging strategy. Again, the overlap of the 
281 planning periods caused a seemingly large number of trades. 
The dollar values of the best positions were substantially large~ 
than the absolute values of the worst position~ for both single and 
multiple contracts using the selective hedging strategies. The same 
relationship was true for the largest quarterly profits and losses. 
The point and figure chart strategies did a better job of minimizing 
the adverse futures positions, but the moving average strategies had 
smaller quarterly losses. 
Probably the most unusual result in Table XIX was the standard 
deviation for the "hedge and hold" strategy. Four of the six selective 
strategies had a lower standard deviation than Strategy 2 while all 
six resulted in significantly lower average costs. Based on these two 
criteria alone, the selective hedging strategies were clearly superior 
to the "hedge and hold" strategy during this period. 
All the selective hedging strategies reduced the high cost by 
at least $60 per head relative to the ''no hedge" strategy. However, 
none of these strategies were able to reduce the low cost of $159.92 
per head obtained with the "no hedge" strategy. It should be pointed 
out that the high and low co.st figures represent only one of the 
possible 281 planning periods for each strategy. 
The 4-Sw moving average strategy reduced the average cost of a 
feeder steer the most to $239.87 per head or $37.12 per cwt. over the 
six-year period. This average cost is $20.82 per head or $3.22 per 
90 
cwt. lower than the average cost of Strategy 1. The optimized point 
and figure chart strategy, Strategy 8, was a very close second with a 
$240.54 per head average cost which is equivalent to $37.23 per cwt. 
for a 646 pound feeder steer. 
Summary 
The selective hedging strategies very effectively reduced the 
average cost for feeder steers and the standard deviation associated 
with that cost during the simulation period from 1972 through 1977. 
These results are especially significant when it is considered that 
downward trending cattle prices occurred during much of this period. 
These strategies could greatly benefit the cattle feeder in the years 
to come as feeder cattle prices begin trending upward.. The point and 
figure charts and the moving averages both did a very good job of sig-
naling the turns in the feeder cattle futures market. Use of either 
of these technical price analysis tools would have contributed over 
$20 per head to the profits _of the cattle feeding activity throughout 
this six-year period. 
The futures profits from the 180-day planning period were roughly 
twice those for the 90-day period. This evidence indicates that a 
relatively long planning period may be more effective in achieving a 
more favorable price than a shorter planning period. It seems only 
natural that a longer time period results in more opportunities which 
can be taken advantage of by an effective selective hedging strategy. 
Profits in the cattle feeding business are never so large that 
the cattle feeder can pass up the opportunity to add to his feeding 
profits. The long feeder cattle hedge provides such an opportunity 
to the cattle feeder who is willing to use an effective hedging 
strategy suited to his own needs. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Volatile feeder cattle prices during the 1970's have dramatically 
pointed out the importance of the marketing decisions faced by cattle 
producers. It is doubtful that the stable and well-behaved feeder 
cattle prices of the 1960's will be experienced again anytime soon. 
Therefore, the marketing decisions involved with the selling and buying 
of feeder cattle will continue to be a ve,ry important factor affecting 
the financial condition of the feeder cattle producer and cattle feeder. 
The benefits and ~dva~tages gained from utilizing the latest production 
technology can be completely offset from the lack of a sound marketing 
strategy. 
The marketing strategy developed by a cattle producer should be 
based on his goals or objectives. This study assumed a primary goal of 
profit maximization with reduction of risk as a secondary goal but none-
theless still a very important goal. Hedging in the feeder cattle 
futures market was the tool selected for obtaining this objective of a 
more favorable price. It was hypothesized that te~hnical price analysis 
of the feeder cattle futures market would assist the feeder cattle 
hedger in determining the optimum time to place and lift hedges, and as 
a, result this would increase profits and reduce the price risk. 
The parameters for point and figure charts and moving averages were 
optimized to obtain maximum net profits from the futures market. The 
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results from the optimization of these technical price analysis tools 
were then applied to develop selective hedging strategies for feeder 
cattle. Three common and realistic feeder cattle production situations 
were simulated to test alternative short hedging strategies, including 
the "no hedge" strategy. To test various long hedging strategies, 90-
day and 180-day planning horizons were simulated for a year-round 
cattle feeding operation requiring feeder cattle weekly. 
Based on the results obtained from the selective hedging strategies, 
it would be very difficult to reject the hypotheses stated in Chapter I. 
The selective hedging strategies effectively increased returns and 
these larger returns were accompanied by lower variability, i.e. less 
risk, when compared with the "no hedge" alternative. 
Generally speaking, the hedging strategies developed from both 
point and figure charts and moving averages performed equally well. 
A hedger could select either tool based on his own individual prefer-
ences without sacrificing sizeable net returns. Both tools are objective 
in nature which removes all subjective elements. Furthermore, both are 
easily understood and simple to u~e. Neither access to extensive data 
sources and a computer nor knowledge of econometric models is required. 
Moving averages and point and figure charts both work best during 
times of big sustained price moves. They do not work well in a choppy 
or siqeways market with small moves up and down. Both of these tools 
will also give false signals during technical price corrections. How-
ever, these tools are ~ore flexible than a monthly or quarterly price 
forecast model. While the forecasts identify long run trends, the 
technical tools are more responsive and can signal day to day changes 
in price directions. As a result, they can adjust to new conditions 
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quicker and therefore have an advantage over price prediction models in 
signaling when to place and lift hedges. 
The simulated results clearly indicate that over time, selective 
hedging is better than not hedging at all on the basis of size and 
variability of net returns. Although past performance is no guarantee 
of future results, there is no reason not to expect similar results in 
the years to come. The hedger should recognize, however, that net 
returns from each production period will not always be increased by 
selective hedging, but in the long run the average net return should be 
higher and less variable. The hedger should also be willing to accept 
the fact that more than half of the trades signaled by technical price 
analysis tools will probably be unprofitable. But the results also 
indicate that the profits will more than offset the losses over time. 
The selective hedger must be willing to stick with his hedging strategy. 
The hedger who abuses a selective strategy by failing to honor the sig-
nals is playing a guessing game which has hurt so many in the futures 
market. 
One should not assume that the hedging strategies developed for 
feeder cattle will work just as well for other commodities, even for 
closely related commodities such as live cattle. Each commodity has 
its own special characteristics which prevent the transfer of specific 
hedging strategies among commodities. 
Although it was not a primary objective, the results of this 
study cast further doubt on the relevance of the random walk theory of 
commodity futures price behavior, at least concerning the feeder cattle 
futures market. It is unlikely that the size of the profits obtained 
from the futures market using the mechanical trading devices tested in 
this study would have occurred if the price fluctuated in a purely 
random fashion.-
Suggestions for Further Research 
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Other a.reas of related research appear very promising. Research 
needs to be oone on the use of trend lines with point and figure charts 
since a properly constructed trend line would eliminate many of the 
false signals in a sideways market. Specifically, it needs to be deter-
mined if the conventional 45° line is best or if some other angle works 
better. Other rules need to be developed concerning the exact place-
ment of the trend line and under what conditions it should be used. 
Additional research is also advisable to discover which parameter com-
binations, if any, are better suited to use in conjunction with trend 
lines. 
More work needs to be done concerning price projections obtained 
from point and figure charts using horizontal and vertical counts. 
Questions about the reliability of the forecast and the length of time 
elpased before the projection is realized need to be answered. 
The usefulness of other technical price analysis tools needs to 
be studied. Such possibilities include oscillators, the Elliot Wave 
Theory, and bar charts. Research concerning bar chart formations and 
trend lines should be very promising. 
Finally., research similar to th?t undertaken in this study seems 
worthwhile for other agricultural commodities, such as hogs, live· 
cattle, wheat, corn,, soybeans, etc. Any information which enables the 
agricultural producer of the 1970's to do a better job of marketing 
should be very helpful in alleviating many of his crucial problems. 
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